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I. INTRODUCTION
Secrecy is a hot topic.' In particular, scholars and pundits have begun to
fill the pages of law reviews and newspapers with their arguments about the
t Yale Law School, J.D. 2006. Yale College, B.A. 2002. Thanks to Professors Alec Stone
Sweet and Jim Whitman for their help and guidance. Special thanks to Professor Peter Schuck for all his
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extent to which the government should use secret evidence 2 in legal
proceedings. 3 On the one hand, the government's conduct of the Combatant
Status Review Tribunals 4 and the rules of procedure it has promulgated for
the military commissions at Guantanamo Bay5 have provoked complaints, as
did the government's refusal to permit Zacarias Moussaoui access to certain
terrorist witnesses detained abroad.6 On the other hand, many accept that the
government may adduce secret evidence to justify blocking the assets of a
charity that supports terrorism.
7
For several reasons, the propriety of using secret evidence in
immigration cases has been a subject of particular dispute. First, the press has
disclosed that some number of immigration cases have gone awry because the
government relied on inaccurate secret evidence. 8 Second, when and how the
immigration services use secret evidence is well known. 9 Third, courts
assessing the legality of secret evidence in other contexts often reason by
1. Consider, for instance, the publicity that attended the release of Judge Taylor's opinion in
ACLU v. NSA, No. 06-CV-10204 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 17, 2006), available at
http://balkin.blogspot.com/06%2010204.pdf. See, e.g., Posting of Jason Harrow to SCOTUSBIog,
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2006/08/roundup-.mostly.html (Aug. 18, 2006, 10:17
EST) (collecting comments).
2. 1 define secret evidence as "evidence used to prove the Government's case... [that is not]
disclosed to the individual." Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959). Within that category I
include both "confidential" and "national security" information. By "national security" information, I
mean any information that is properly classified as SECRET or TOP SECRET. See Exec. Order No.
13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196, 196-97 (2003).
3. For a summary of the ways in which the government has sought to use secret evidence
since the attacks of September 11, see PHILIP B. HEYMANN & JULIETTE N. KAYYEM, PROTECTING
LIBERTY IN AN AGE OF TERROR (2005); Tracy L. Conn, The Use of Secret Evidence by Government
Lawyers: Balancing Defendants' Rights with National Security Concerns, 52 CLEV. ST. L, REV. 571
(2004); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Secret Evidence is Slowly Eroding the Adversary System: CIPA and FISA in
the Courts, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063 (2006); Note, Secret Evidence in the War on Terror, 118 HARV. L.
REv. 1962 (2005).
4. See, e.g., In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 468-69 (D.D.C. 2005).
5. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2797-98 (2006); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 168 (D.D.C. 2004).
6. See, e.g., Joshua L. Dratel, Ethical Issues in Defending a Terrorism Case: How Secrecy
and Security Impair the Defense of a Terrorism Case, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 81, 102-03
(2003).
7. See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (Supp. I 2001); Holy Land Found. for Relief& Dev. v. Ashcroft,
333 F.3d 156, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Global Relief Found. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2002).
Many also believe that the government may use secret evidence to justify denying certain passengers the
right to board commercial aircraft. See, e.g., Justin Florence, Note, Making the No Fly List Fly: A Due
Process Model for Terrorist Watchlists, 115 YALE L.J. 2148, 2167-71 (2006) (suggesting that the
government provide a traveler whom it wishes to add to the terrorist watchlist with compensatory
counsel able to see the secret evidence adduced against the traveler).
8. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE
SEPTEMBER II DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES
IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER II ATTACKS 78 (2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf [hereinafter THE SEPTEMBER II DETAINEES]. For one
particular non-citizen's story, see DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 18-21 (2003); Ali A1-Maqtari 's Story,
LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL BOYLE, http://immigrantcenter.com/almaqtari.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2006).
9. Cf Eric Lichtblau, Panel Rebuffed on Documents on US. Spying, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,
2006, at A I (noting that the government will not turn over legal memoranda explaining the bases for the
NSA terrorist surveillance program); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Gilmore v. Gonzales, No. 04-
15736 (9th Cir. Jan. 26, 2006), available at http://www.papersplease.org/gilmore/-dU
Gilmore-petition.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2006).
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analogy to immigration practice. "° Finally, and most importantly, because
immigration law has become an antiterrorism tool, 1 the government relies
most often on secret evidence in immigration cases.' 2 Indeed, in the words of
the U.N. Security Council, the United States believes that "effective border
controls" may prevent terrorism.' 3
I offer a fresh perspective on this running argument.14 While others have
either excoriated15 or praised the government's use of secret evidence in
immigration cases,' 6 no one has asked my question: Regardless of whether or
not such use of secret evidence is "fair" or "unfair" in the abstract, to what
extent is immigration procedure in tension with criminal procedure-that is,
how broad has the gap between immigration law and criminal law become?
To answer this question, I examine comparable Canadian and United
Kingdom rules governing both immigration cases and criminal cases." From
10. See Note, supra note 3, at 1967-7 1. Indeed, the justifications the government has offered
for its reliance on secret evidence before the Guantanamo military commissions-the President's
authority over foreign affairs and the legal inability of certain groups to claim the protections of our
Constitution-are quite familiar from immigration law. Compare Brief for the Respondents in
Opposition to Certiorari at 19 n.l 1, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-184 (S. Ct. 2005), available at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/nkk/documents/HamdanBfief.opp.pdf with Landon v. Plasencia,
459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982), and Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 734 (1893).
I. Mary Beth Sheridan, Immigration Law as Anti-Terrorism Tool, WASH. POST, June 13,
2005, at Al. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1259-60 (1996), codified this relationship between immigration law and
antiterrorism. See Daniel Moeckli, The Selective 'War on Terror': Executive Detention of Foreign
Nationals and the Principle of Non-Discrimination, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 495, 504-05 & nn.51-52
(2006). See generally Marissa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Terrorism and Asylum Seekers: Why the REAL ID
Act Is a False Promise (Villanova Pub. L. and Leg. Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2006-01,
Mar. 2006). This is true not only in the United States, but also abroad. See Kent Roach, Sources and
Trends in Post 9/11 Anti-Terrorism Laws, 9-10 (Univ. of Toronto Leg. Studies Series, Paper No.
899291, Apr. 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-899291 (last visited Aug. 31, 2006).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 127-129.
13. S.C. Res. 1373, 2(g), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
14. See, e.g., The Use of Secret Evidence in Immigration Proceedings and H.R. 2121 Before
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of David Cole, Professor, Georgetown
University Law Center), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2000/cole.html; Matthew R. Hall,
Procedural Due Process Meets National Security: The Problem of Classified Evidence in Immigration
Proceedings, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 515 (2002); D. Mark Jackson, Exposing Secret Evidence:
Eliminating a New Hardship of United States Immigration Policy, 19 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 25 (2000-
2001); Michael Scaperlanda, Are We That Far Gone?: Due Process and Secret Deportation
Proceedings, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 23 (1996); Secret Evidence in the War on Terror, supra note 3;
Kelley Brooke Snyder, Note, A Clash of Values: Classified Information in Immigration Proceedings, 88
VA. L. REV. 447 (2002); Editorial, Free Nasser Ahmed, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 1999, at A26.
15. Jackson, supra note 14, at 42-43.
16. Scaperlanda, supra note 14, at 30.
17. Canada and the United Kingdom are appropriate points of comparison with the United
States for three reasons. First, all three countries have substantial experience with the problem of
terrorism. Compare THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS ON CANADA'S ANTI-TERRORISM BILL (Ronald
J. Daniels et al. eds., 2001), and Reg Whitaker, Keeping up with the Neighbours? Canadian Responses
to 9/11 in Historical and Comparative Context, 41 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 241, 249 (2003), with CLIVE
WALKER, BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO THE ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION 1 (2002), and Geoffrey Bennett,
Legislative Responses to Terrorism: A View from Britain, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 947, 948 (2005), and
with RICHARD A. POSNER, PREVENTING SURPRISE ATTACKS: INTELLIGENCE REFORM IN THE WAKE OF
9/11, at 186 (2005), and John Yoo, Courts at War, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 573, 574 (2006). Second, each
distinguishes between citizens and non-citizens and among non-citizens. Compare Canada (Minister of
Employment & Immigration) v. Chiarelli, [1992] S.C.R. 711, 714 ("[N]on-citizens do not have an
unqualified right to enter or remain in the country."), and NINETrE KELLEY & MICHAEL TREBILCOCK,
THE MAKING OF THE MOSAIC: A HISTORY OF CANADIAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 350 (1998)
("[I]mmigration was a privilege and not a right .. "), with STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND
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an impressionistic survey of those rules, I tentatively conclude that Canada
and the United Kingdom, nations less committed, in the abstract, to procedural
due process than the United States, 18 and hence usually less willing to require
disclosure of secret evidence to criminal defendants, 19 nevertheless
circumscribe and monitor the use of secret evidence in immigration cases
comparatively thoroughly. In other words, there is a tighter proportional
relationship between the rules governing immigration cases and the rules
governing criminal cases in Canada and the United Kingdom than there is in
the United States. I also offer an explanation for this difference: The U.S.
rules governing secret evidence in immigration cases diverge so dramatically
from their criminal equivalents because U.S. courts, unlike their Canadian and
U.K. counterparts, have not asked whether the government is invoking
immigration law as a pretext, as a way to justify detention and interrogation
without having to make its case in court. 20 Although they are adept at
'smoking out' illegitimate motives,2 1 U.S. courts have refused to ask whether
the government may be concealing evidence from defendants for
inappropriate reasons, and this refusal has permitted the gap between
immigration law and criminal law to grow comparatively wide.
This Note proceeds in four parts. In Part II, I present my puzzle:
Canadian and U.K. courts are at once more tolerant of secret evidence in
criminal cases than are U.S. courts, and yet they are more willing to let non-
citizens see such evidence in immigration cases than are courts in the United
States. I also offer an explanation: The United States is using immigration law
as a pretext. It has not had to develop rules for trying terrorists because it has
THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA (1987), and Zig Layton-Henry, Patterns of
Privilege: Citizenship Rights in Britain, in CITIZENSHIP IN A GLOBAL WORLD: COMPARING CITIZENSHIP
RIGHTS FOR ALIENS 116, 129 (Atsushi Kondo ed., 2001) (While permanent residents "are entitled to
social benefits and pensions . . . [tlemporary visitors are specifically excluded"), and with PETER H.
SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS ON IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 176-78
(1998), and David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The Real
Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SuP. CT. REv. 47, 92 (2001) ("The basic structure of community
membership levels in this setting employs six distinct categories .... "). Third and finally, each applies
the common law. Cf Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Schleifer, Legal Origins, Q.J. ECON. 1193, 1193-94
(2002) (arguing that cultural and political differences between late medieval England and France
account for persistent differences between common law and civil law systems, including their current
amenability to development).
18. Compare Mirjan Damaska, A Continental Lawyer in an American Law School: Trials and
Tribulations ofAdjustment, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1375 (1968) ("The Continental will seek the right
solution; his counterpart will . . . [have] a procedural outlook."), with Amalia D. Kessler, Our
Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the
Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1213 (2005) ("From [our] history, we have inherited a vague but
enduring belief that procedure ... is of key importance.").
19. See infra Part II.B.
20. See, e.g., Karen C. Tumlin, Suspect First: How Terrorism Policy Is Reshaping
Immigration Policy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1173, 1178 (2004).
21. See Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 436-37 (1997).
22. Some believe not only that the government has abused its immigration power in order to
investigate and interrogate, but also that it has done so in invidious ways. See COLE, supra note 8, at
164; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRESUMPTION OF GUILT: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES OF POST-SEPTEMBER 11
DETAINEES 3 (2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/us9 11/USA0802.pdf; Susan M.
Akram & Maritza Karmely, Immigration and Constitutional Consequences of Post-9/J l Policies
Involving Arabs and Muslims in the United States: Is Alienage a Distinction Without a Difference, 38
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 609, 619 (2005); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575,
1578-79 (2002).
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been able to use the secret evidence permitted by immigration law to justify
suspected terrorists' detention and interrogation. By contrast, Canada and the
United Kingdom have promulgated laws and developed legal doctrines to
govern the incarceration and investigation of terrorists. In Part III, I explore
how this came to pass. I argue that although courts in the United States,
Canada, and the United Kingdom all distinguish civil (and immigration) law
enforcement from criminal law enforcement, 23 U.S. courts appear to have
elided this distinction when it comes to the treatment of immigrant-terrorists.
In Part III, I also present and assess three theories that might plausibly explain
why Canadian and U.K. courts better police the line between immigration law
and criminal law than U.S. courts do. Although I find none of the three
theories fully persuasive, I draw upon them in Part IV to suggest a new
strategy for those who wish U.S. courts to impose greater procedural
constraints on the U.S. government. In that Part, I first describe a set of
judicial and congressional solutions to the problems the use of secret evidence
poses, and then highlight why my solutions are more feasible than is the
current approach-claiming that the use of secret evidence in immigration
proceedings violates the Due Process Clause. In Part V, I offer a brief
conclusion.
II. THE COMPARISON: THE USE OF SECRET EVIDENCE IN IMMIGRATION
CASES IN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
A. Criminal Law
1. Anonymous Witnesses
Courts in both Canada and the United Kingdom permit the government
to call anonymous witnesses. 24 Sometimes informants (and, in the United
Kingdom, members of the intelligence agency M15 25) testify from behind
23. The recent debate concerning the propriety of involving local police in the enforcement of
immigration laws both implicates and highlights the continuing vitality of this distinction. Compare Kris
W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police to Make
Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 191 (2005), with Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police
Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084 (2004).
24. In the United Kingdom, this practice dates from the 1970s, when conflict in Northern
Ireland flared. See LORD DIPLOCK, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO CONSIDER LEGAL PROCEDURES TO
DEAL WITH TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, paras. 7(a) and 17 (1972); R v. Murphy
[1990] N. Ir. L.R. 306. In 1993, R v. Watford Magistrates' Court ex parte Lenman confirmed that
doctrines announced at that time would be generally applicable. See Case Comment, 1993 Crim. L.R.
388. See generally Kevin Dooley Kent, Note, Basic Rights and Anti-Terrorism Legislation: Can
Britain's Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998 Be Reconciled with Its Human Rights
Act?, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 221,241 (2001). For a discussion of this practice's history in Canada,
see G. Marcus, Secret Witnesses, [1990] Pub. L. 207, 220-23.
25. 572 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th Ser.) (1996) 401 (statement of Baroness Hilton) (noting that
"[MI5's] members can be given anonymity as witnesses"), quoted in Laura K. Donoghue, Anglo-
American Privacy and Surveillance, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1059, 1203 (2006).
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screens or using voice scramblers.26 On other occasions, the government may
present affidavits at trial, with the names of the affiants redacted.27
By contrast, in the United States, the use of screens or scramblers is
28nearly always forbidden. As the Supreme Court explained in United States v.
Smith, "[t]he witness' name and address open countless avenues of in-court
examination .... To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry ... is effectively to
emasculate the right of cross-examination itself." 29 The only substantial
exception is for children bringing abuse charges.30 Indeed, the government has
conceded in at least one recent case that it may not be able to protect the
identity of valuable, confidential informants at trial.3'
Moreover, in Canada and the United Kingdom, if the government does
not wish to use an informant's testimony in court, the defendant can rarely
discover his identity (even if, for instance, knowing the informant's identity
might help him impeach the credibility of other government witnesses).32 On
the other hand, in the United States, where an informant's identity might be
"relevant and helpful" to a defendant, the Supreme Court requires its
disclosure. 33 As one U.S. court has noted, "the defendant is generally able to
establish a right to disclosure ....34
This same pattern holds when the government wishes to use informants
to persuade a court to deny bail or discretionary relief from extradition. For
instance, in R. ex parte A l-Fawwaz v. Governor of Brixton Prison, a British
court found, "CS/1 [a confidential informant] claims to have been directly
involved in the conspiracy and to be in mortal fear by reason of his co-
operation with the authorities. He needs anonymity at this stage."
35
26. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 24, at 220-23; R. v. Levogiannis, (1990) 1 O.R.3d 351
(Can.); R ex parte Director of Public Prosecutions v. West London Youth Court, [2005] EWHC
(Admin) 2834; R v Davis (lain) [2006] EWCA (Crim) 1155 (Eng.).
27. See NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, EVIDENCE LAW: WITNESS ANONYMITY 42 (1997)
("The protection of intimidated witnesses was referred to in R v. Stinchcombe."), available at
http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/UploadFiles/Publications/Publication 43_83 PP29.pdf; R v. Glen
Williams, [1999] EWCA (Crim) 511 (Eng.); R. v. Ward, (1993) 1 W.L.R. 619, 646; Case Comment, R
v. Hallett, 1986 Crim. L.R. 462.
28. See, e.g., Alvarado v. Superior Court, 5 P.3d 203, 208 (Cal. 2000).
29. 390 U.S. 129, 131 (1967); see also United States v. Fuentes, 988 F. Supp. 861, 864 (E.D.
Pa. 1997) ("'[A] witness's use of a fictitious name will transform him into a wraith."').
30. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990); cf Alison Harvison Young, Child Sexual
Abuse and the Law of Evidence: Some Current Canadian Issues, 11 CAN. J. FAM. L. 11,30 n.57 (1992)
("[C]anadian courts are less willing to see these provisions [permitting the government to rely on secret
evidence during sexual abuse trials] as constituting violations of the accused's constitutional rights than
their American counterparts ....").
31. See Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Compel
Production of Discovery at 1-2, United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002) (CR no.
02-37-A) (accepting that Confidential Source I "may be required to testify under [his] true name...").
32. See R. v. Lipert, [1997] S.C.R. 281, para. 12 (Can.); R v. Hennessey, (1979) 68 Crim.
App. 419,426 (U.K.); see also R v. Agar, (1989) 90 Crim. App. 318, 324.
33. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957). For a description of this area of law,
see Thomas A. Mauet, Informant Disclosure and Production: A Second Look at Paid Informants, 37
ARIZ. L. REV. 563 (1995).
34. United States v. Saa, 859 F.2d 1067, 1073 (2d Cir. 1988) (emphasis added); see also
United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1107 (4th Cir. 1985).
35. (2001) 1 W.L.R. 1234, 1246.
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2. Information Withheld
Courts in both Canada and the United Kingdom permit the government
to use secret, documentary evidence in two ways. First, it may use it
offensively-to prove its case-in-chief. In Canada, for instance, the
government may certify that it believes, on the basis of secret information,
that a charity has engaged in terrorist activity. 36 A judge must then review the
evidence on which the government has relied, but that judge need only
provide the charity and its representatives "with a reasonable opportunity to
be heard" and need not disclose the information the government has presented
in camera (it only need provide a "statement summarizing the information").37
By contrast, in the United States, the comparable law has been interpreted by
the D.C. Circuit to require affording charities suspected of terrorist activity a
fuller opportunity to present evidence.
38
Likewise, the government may use secret evidence to buttress its
position in disputes ancillary to the main course of the criminal trial. For
instance, courts in Canada and the United Kingdom permit the use of secret
evidence during inquests by coroners39 or at committal hearings. 40 Yet in the
United States, it is only occasionally and with considerable reluctance that
courts allow the government to introduce confidential information during bail
hearings.
41
Second, Canadian and U.K. courts also permit the government to use
secret evidence defensively by denying defendants access to potentially
exculpatory secret, documentary evidence. Both Canada and the United
Kingdom have analogues to the Brady rule,42 which requires the government
to hand over any exculpatory evidence it may possess. Yet prosecutors in both
countries may withhold evidence, both under statute 43 and by claiming "public
36. See David G. Duff, Charitable Status and Terrorist Financing: Rethinking the Proposed
Charities Registration (Security Information) Act, in THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 17, at 321,
327-30.
37. Id. at 328-29.
38. Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192, 209 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
39. See, e.g., R v. Her Majesty's Coroner for Newcastle upon Tyne ex parte "A", [1997]
EWHC (Admin) 1172; Devine v. Att'y Gen. for N. Ireland, (1992) 1 All E.R. 609, 613 (H.L.).
40. R v. Watford Magistrates Court ex parte Lenman, [1992] C.O.D. 474 (Q. B.) (committal);
see also R v. Governor of Pentonville Prison exparte Osman, (1990) 1 W.L.R 277 (Q. B.) (extradition).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Abuhamra, 389 F.3d 309, 314 (2d Cir. 2004); see also United
States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382, 391 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Wind, 527 F.2d 672, 676 (6th
Cir. 1975).
42. Compare Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), with R. v. F. (L.X.), (1995) 173
A.R., para. 28 (Can.), and with R v. Ward, (1993) 1 W.L.R. 619, 641 (A.C.) (U.K.).
43. See Antiterrorism Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 41 (Can.). See also KENT ROACH, SEPTEMBER 11:
CONSEQUENCES FOR CANADA 109 (2003); Kathy Grant, The Unjust Impact of Canada's Anti-Terrorism
Act on an Accused's Right to Full Answer and Defence, 16 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 137,
144 (2003); Patricia McMahon, Amending the Access to Information Act: Does National Security
Require the Proposed Amendments of Bill C-36?, 60 U. TORONTO. FAC. L. REV., Winter 2002, at 89, 92-
95; Kent Roach & Gary Trotter, Miscarriages of Justice in the War Against Terror, 109 PENN. ST. L.
REV. 967, 990 (2005); Hamish Stewart, Rule of Law or Executive Fiat? Bill C-36 and Public Interest
Immunity, in THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 17, at 217. Likewise, in the United Kingdom, the
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, c. 25 (Eng.), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1996/1996025.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2006), was, in the words of
one observer, meant "to restrict defense access to ... police and prosecution files," Stanley Z. Fisher,
The Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to Seek Exculpatory Evidence in Police Hands: Lessons from England,
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1379, 1390 (2000).
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interest immunity," a common law privilege against disclosure. 44 In both
Canada and the United Kingdom, the Crown may claim public interest45roeuonta
immunity for entire classes of documents, and the prosecution team need not
always disclose evidence held by other branches of government. By contrast,
in the United States, the prosecution may not rely on blanket assertions of
privilege nor shirk its duty to disclose if the information sought is held by
other agencies.
47
To give one example, in R v. H., a U.K. court considered how to respond
to "defence requests that the Crown provide evidence that the appropriate
authorities had been obtained . . . for ... surveillance." 48 The Crown claimed
public interest immunity.49 In a similar Canadian case, the court refused to
permit the defense full access to the evidence the government had relied upon
to obtain permission to engage in surveillance. 50 By contrast, in the United
States, the government must disclose to a defendant whether he has been
subject to electronic surveillance, 51 and, if the defendant makes a motion to
suppress evidence gleaned from that surveillance, he may be entitled to further
information 52 and to a full-blown adversary hearing.
53
Likewise, although Canada and the United Kingdom have analogues to
the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, in Canada
(Attorney General) v. Ribic a Canadian court refused, for national security
reasons, to allow a defendant to subpoena two witnesses whose testimony
might have been useful to him. 54 By contrast, in the United States, "a
defendant [is] entitled to disclosure of classified information upon a showing
that the information 'is relevant and helpful .... Indeed, the Classified
Information Procedures Act (CIPA) requires that a defendant be given
44. See generally ADAM TOMKINS, THE CONSTITUTION AFTER SCOTT 169 (1998); JOHN
SOPINKA ET AL., THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CANADA 862 (1999).
45. Bisaillon v. Keable, (1983) 2 S.C.R. 60, 97-98 (Can.); Rogers v. Home Secretary, [1973]
A.C. 388, 400 (U.K.); see also John Griffith, The Official Secrets Act 1989, 16 J. L. & Soc'Y. 273, 276
(1989); A.A.S. Zuckerman, Public Interest Immunity-A Matter of Prime Judicial Responsibility, 57
MOO. L. REV. 703, 706 (1994); cf Merricks v. Nott-Bower, (1964) 1 All E.R. 717.
46. Wayne N. Renke, Applications for Third-Party Records: The Relationship of the
O'Connor Procedure to Other Application Procedures, 40 ALBERTA L. REV. 593, 639-40 (2002); Rowe
and Davis v. United Kingdom, 2000 Eur. Ct. H.R. 91.
47. Indeed, in 1998, the then-Associate General Counsel of the CIA went so far as to say that
"when intelligence activities produce information that may be relevant ... [to] the defense[, t]he failure
to disclose intelligence information in specific cases may jeopardize ... the[ir] discovery rights . "
Jonathan M. Fredman, Intelligence Agencies, Law Enforcement, and the Prosecution Team, 16 YALE L.
& POL'Y REV. 331, 338 (1998); see, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995); see also Mark D.
Villaverde, Note, Structuring the Prosecutor's Duty to Search the Intelligence Community for Brady
Material, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1471, 1475 (2003).
48. Gareth Underhill & D.C. Ormerod, Case & Commentary, R. v. Hardy, 2003 Crim. L.R.
394, 394.
49. Id.; see also Tom Rees & D.C. Ormerod, Case & Commentary, R. v. Lawrence, 2001
Crim. L.R. 584, 587.
50. R. v. Garofoli, (1990) 2 S.C.R. 1421. See generally Ian Leigh, Secret Proceedings in
Canada, 34 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 113, 127 (1996).
51. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c) (2002).
52. United States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d 141, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("[A] criminal defendant
may claim that he has been the victim of an illegal surveillance and seek discovery of the logs of the
overhears.").
53. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
54. [2003] F.C. 246, para. 4.
55. United States v..Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 472 (4th Cir. 2004).
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1. Removing Legal Aliens
In the United States, if the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS), now the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),57
suspects a Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) of terrorist activity, 58 it may use
the Alien Terrorist Removal Court (ATRC) to remove59 him .60 First, an
ATRC judge assesses the government's evidence. The ATRC convenes if the
judge determines that there is probable cause to believe the LPR may be a
terrorist and if the judge concludes that the government could not feasibly
remove him by other means. 61 Although the government may adduce secret
evidence before the ATRC, it must try insofar as possible to summarize that
evidence for the non-citizen. LPRs are entitled to a government-paid attorney
who has the requisite security clearance to see any classified information upon
which the government wishes to rely.
62
Although subject to removal before the ATRC, the INS may not refuse
an LPR entry at the border solely on the basis of secret evidence. In Rafeedie
v. INS, the D.C. Circuit explained, "Congress ... clearly envisioned that the
procedures [that permit the use of secret evidence to exclude non-citizens]...
would be applied to 'aliens seeking admission to the United States,' who have
no constitutional rights to any prescribed process, ' 63 not to LPRs. The D.C.
Circuit is on sound footing; the Supreme Court has repeatedly hinted that
permanent residents returning from abroad are entitled to more process at the
border than first-time applicants seeking admission.
64
Canada, like the United States, has long permitted the government to
rely on secret evidence to remove LPRs. 6 The government may file a
56. United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1998). For a general discussion of
CIPA, see Saul M. Pilchen & Benjamin B. Klubes, Using the Classified Information Procedures Act in
Criminal Cases: A Primer for Defense Counsel, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191 (1994).
57. ICE is within the Department of Homeland Security. See Immigrations and Customs
Enforcement, http://www.ice.gov/graphics/index.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2005). Throughout this Note,
I will use the terms 'INS' and 'ICE' interchangeably.
58. An alien terrorist is any non-citizen described in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (2000).
59. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)
"changed the vocabulary of immigration proceedings, recharacterizing actions that had been referred to
as 'deportation' and 'exclusion' as 'removal."' Zhang v. INS, 386 F.3d 66, 67 (2d Cir. 2004).
Throughout this Note, I occasionally employ some pre-IIRIRA vocabulary.
60. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1532-35 (2000). For a general description of this court, see Peter H.
Schuck, Terrorism Cases Demand New Hybrid Courts, L.A. TIMES, July 9, 2004, at B 13.
61. 8 U.S.C. § 1533(c) (2000).
62. Id. § 1534(e)(3)(E)-(F); see also Snyder, supra note 14, at 470 ("The law provides
additional protections for permanent resident aliens.").
63. 880 F.2d 506, 513, 521-25 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United States ex rel. Kasel de Pagliera v.
Savoretti, 139 F. Supp. 143 (S.D. Fla. 1956).
64. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 600 (1952); see also Landon v. Plasencia,
459 U.S. 21, 33 (1982).
65. Canada does not distinguish between removal of non-citizens at the border and removal of
those within Canada. For consistency with U.S. terminology, I use the word "removal" indifferently to
mean both.
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certificate alleging that a non-citizen is a suspected terrorist.66 A federal udge
assesses the evidentiary basis for this certificate-which is often secret. 6 The
non-citizen may contest the legitimacy of the certificate, but he may not see
any secret evidence upon which the government has relied, nor is he entitled
to counsel who can. Nevertheless, the federal judge is expected to scrutinize
strictly the evidence underlying the certificate. As one court of appeals has
noted, the non-citizen "is assisted . . . by the designated judge who has the
heavy responsibility of maintaining a balance between the parties .... ,,6 9 The
judges charged with reviewing certificates have taken their job seriously and
have declassified and turned over substantial amounts of information to the
non-citizens named in security certificates.7 °
In the United Kingdom, as in Canada 71 and the United States, the
government may use secret evidence to justify removal. The Special
Immigration Appeals Commission Act of 199772 and the Anti-terrorism,
Crime and Security Act of 2001 (ATCSA) 73 explicitly permit the government
to remove a non-citizen on the basis of secret evidence.7 4 Moreover, the
Secretary of State has long had the authority to exclude those whom she is
satisfied are "concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts
of terrorism ... Even those otherwise entitled to enter (because they are
LPRs or citizens of Ireland 76) can be excluded.
However, in all cases, the Special Immigration Appeals Commission
(SIAC) reviews the government's evidence. When it does so, it may order the
66. See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 27, § 77(1) (Can.)
[hereinafter IRPA] ("The Minister and the Solicitor General of Canada shall sign a certificate stating
that a permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of security .... ).
67. See generally Benjamin L. Berger, Our Evolving Judicature: Security Certificates,
Detention Review, and the Federal Court, 39 U.B.C. L. REV. 101 (2006).
68. Cf Re Harkat, (2005) 2 F.C. 416, para. 47 ("Parliament, when dealing with security
certificates, has chosen not to ... [permit] independent counsel.").
69. Charkaoui v. Canada, [2005] F.C. 421, para. 82.
70. See, e.g., id. paras. 17-18.
71. Several U.K. immigration laws have been modeled on analogues in Canada. See Sec'y of
State for the Home Dep't v. Rehman, [2001] UKHL 47, [9]-[10], (2001) 3 W.L.R. 877, reprinted in THE
UNITED KINGDOM'S RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 439, 442 (Yonah Alexander & Edgar H. Brenner, eds.,
2003) ("The European Court of Human Rights was impressed by... Canada .... The response of the
[U.K.] government was to introduce the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 .. ")
72. For a detailed discussion of this Act, see Helen Fenwick, The Anti- Terrorism, Crime and
Security Act 2001: A Proportionate Response to 11 September, 65 MOO. L. REV. 724 (2002).
73. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, §§ 21-23 (U.K.) [hereinafter ACS],
available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts200l/20010024.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2006). For more
information on the Act, including those provisions that purport to derogate from the European
Convention on Human Rights, see Virginia Helen Henning, Note & Comment, Anti-terrorism, Crime
and Security Act 2001: Has the United Kingdom Made a Valid Derogation From the European
Convention on Human Rights?, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1263 (2002). Cf Roach & Trotter, supra note
43, at 97. See generally Rhonda Powell, Human Rights, Derogation and Anti-Terrorist Detention, 69
SASK. L. REV. 79 (2006).
74. See ACS, supra note 73, § 22(2)(a) (explaining that the Special Immigration Appeals
Commission Act of 1997 applies to decisions "refusing leave to enter or remain in the United
Kingdom").
75. Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1989, c.4, § 5(l)(a) (U.K.).
76. Indeed, the most notorious use of this power "occurred in December 1982, when Gerry
Adams . . . w[as] confined to Northern Ireland." CLIVE WALKER, THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM IN
BRITISH LAW 85 (2d ed. 1992).
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defendant removed from the courtroom.77 But if it does, "[a] security-cleared
'special advocate' appointed by the [Special Immigration Appeals]
commission represents the detainee." 78 SIAC's review is reasonably
stringent. 79 It has refused to approve a removal order sought by the
government on at least one occasion. 80 In that case, M. v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department, SIAC found that it was unreasonable for the
Secretary of State to suspect "M" of terrorist activity. In part, its determination
was based on doubt about the "material relied on by the Secretary of State."
81
2. Illegal Aliens
The INS may also use secret evidence-more readily-to remove non-
citizens who have not achieved lawful-permanent-resident status. They may
remove a non-citizen who has entered without inspection (EWI) 82 or deny a
non-citizen admission at the border. 83 An INS official must simply be
"'satisfied on the basis of confidential information' that the alien falls under
the inadmissibility provision[s]. 84 Courts have approved this practice.85
Yet the INS most often uses secret evidence to deny such aliens
(removable either because they have entered without inspection or simply
inadmissible)-as well as LPRs--discretionary relief. Section 240(b)(4)(B) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) explicitly permits the INS to use
secret evidence under such circumstances. 86 Most courts and agencies to
77. Chistopher Michaelsen, International Human Rights on Trial-The United Kingdom's and
Australia's Legal Response to 9/11, 25 SYDNEY L. REv. 275, 281 (2003).
78. Tom Parker, Appendix, Counterterrorism Policies in the United Kingdom, in HEYMANN
&. KAYYEM, supra note 3, app. A, at 130; see also Roach & Trotter, supra note 3, at 1007. For one
court's account of the special counsel provisions of SlAC, see Secretary of State for the Home
Department v. M., [2004] EWCA (Civ) 324, [13] (Eng.): "[A] special advocate can play an important
role in protecting an appellant's interests before SIAC. He can seek further information. He can ensure
that evidence before SIAC is tested on behalf of the appellant. He can object to evidence and other
information being unnecessarily kept from the appellant."
79. Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman, [2001] UKHL 47, [54] (U.K.)
(noting that SIAC is expected to test "the factual basis for the executive's opinion that deportation would
be in the interests of national security [is] established by evidence").
80. See M. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 324 (U.K.).
81. See id. at [26].
82. IIRIRA effaced any distinction between those within the United States illegally and those
seeking admission at the border. See 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(13)(A) (2004).
83. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (2000).
84. Hall, supra note 14, at 519.
85. See also Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210-211 (1953);
United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
86. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2002) ("[T]he alien ... [may not] examine such national
security information as the Government may proffer in opposition ... to an application by the alien for
discretionary relief."); see also, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 208.12 (2006) (asylum). For descriptions of this
authority, see The Use of Classified Evidence in Immigration Proceedings: Hearing Before the Senate
Judiciary Subcomm. on Technology, Terrorism, and Government of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
105th Cong. (Oct. 8, 1998) (testimony of Paul W. Virtue, General Counsel, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Department of Justice) and Niels W. Frezen, National Security and Procedural
Fairness: Secret Evidence and the Immigration Laws, 76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1677, 1679 (1999). 1
do not discuss "withholding of removal" in this Note. Inasmuch as a non-citizen seeking withholding
"must establish that ... her life or freedom would be threatened," Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Department of
Justice, 434 F.3d 144, 155-56 (2d Cir. 2006), a withholding application is factually related to an asylum
claim. However, withholding is a non-discretionary form of relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(b)(3)(A) (2006)
("The Attorney General may not remove an alien .... ") (emphasis added).
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consider the question have assumed that this use of secret evidence is
permissible. For instance, in United States ex rel. Barbour v. District Director,
the Fifth Circuit concluded, "release on bail ... may be denied on the basis of
confidential information." 87 Likewise, the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA)-the appellate body charged with supervising the work of immigration
judges-has held, "it [is] permissible to consider evidence of a confidential
nature in deciding whether discretionary relief should be granted. 88
This use of secret evidence is not uncontroversial. In Kiareldeen v.
Reno, for instance, the court held that "the decision of the BIA to detain [a
non-citizen], without the right to bond, primarily on the basis of [secret
evidence] . . . violates his Fifth Amendment right to procedural due
process. ' 89 One other district court agrees with this analysis. 9° But Congress
may have settled the dispute. Under Section 412 of the USA PATRIOT Act, 91
the Attorney General may certify that a non-citizen is both dangerous and
inadmissible and order him detained until removed, 92 and he may rely on
secret evidence in deciding whether to certify the non-citizen. His certification
cuts off any discretionary relief for which the non-citizen might otherwise
have been eligible. 93 Moreover, the government has recently begun to use
secret evidence to preclude entire classes of removable non-citizens from
applying for bail. 9 Indeed, the United States has ordered the mandatory
detention of groups of "high interest" non-citizens-mostly "'Arab-Muslim
men.' 95 Many of these "high-interest" detainees have not been informed of
the reasons for the government's interest.
96
In Canada, like the United States, the government may use secret
evidence to justify denying a non-citizen discretionary relief once he is
deemed removable.97 For instance, the government may issue a warrant for
the arrest and detention of an LPR named in a certificate "if they have
reasonable grounds to believe that the permanent resident is a danger to
national security or to the safety of any person or is unlikely to appear at a
87. United States ex rel. Barbour v. District Director, 491 F.2d 573, 578 (5th Cir. 1974). The
Second Circuit concurs. See United States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 392, 394 (2d Cir.
1953) ("[U]se by the Commissioner of confidential information undisclosed to the appellant would not
be in violation of procedural due process.").
88. In re R, 5 1. & N. Dec. 29,45 (B.I.A. 1952) (citing Matter ofA-, I. & N. Dec. 714).
89. 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 414 (D.N.J. 1999).
90. Najjar v. Reno, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1349 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
91. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 § 412, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
1226a(a)(3) (Supp. 1 2001)).
92. 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(3) (Supp. 1. 2001).
93. Id. § 1226a(a)(2)-(3)(b) (Supp. I. 2001). Although any non-citizen detained under Section
412 is entitled to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, non-citizens may not be able to contest issues
of fact (e.g. whether a particular non-citizen is in fact a terrorist). See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 306
(2001).
94. See In re D-J-, 23 i. & N. Dec. 572, 577-79 (Att'y Gen. 2003); see generally Judy
Amorosa, Note, Dissecting In Re D-J-: The Attorney General, Unchecked Power, and the New National
Security Threat Posed by Haitian Asylum Seekers, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 263 (2005).
95. See Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 1409, 2005 WL 2375202, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
27, 2005).
96. See generally id.
97. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 27, §§ 78, 83 (1) (Can.).
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proceeding for removal." 98 Likewise, the Minister of Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness (PSEP) may issue a "danger" opinion based on
secret evidence that permits him to remove a non-citizen who might otherwise
be eligible for asylum.99 The secret evidence is disclosed to the non-citizen
only under limited circumstances, for instance if she can make out a prima
facie case that she might face torture were she returned whence she came.100
Again, however, those refused discretionary relief are entitled to judicial
review of their cases. As the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal recently
explained in Almrei v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), "a
review of [an] order maintaining detention may require review of the secret
evidence .... ,101 Likewise, although Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention
"authorizes a host government to divest itself of its particularized protective
responsibilities"'10 2 under certain circumstances-specifically, when a refugee
threatens national security-Canadian courts carefully scrutinize the secret
evidence underlying any determination that a removable non-citizen may be
ineligible for asylum.' 0 Finally, it bears mention that the Supreme Court of
Canada seems likely to strike down some of these rules when it decides
Charkaoui v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) later this
fall. 104
In the United Kingdom, as in Canada, the government may use secret
evidence to oppose applications for bail or asylum. Yet here again SIAC plays
a role. 10 5 The House of Lords recently affirmed that "anyone deprived of his
liberty by arrest .. . [may challenge] the lawfulness of his detention . . .
98. Id. § 82. In fact, as one author notes, "[i]ronically, since the Supreme Court of Canada's
decision in R. v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, grounds for detaining a permanent resident under the IRPA
are narrower than those to detain an accused under the Criminal Code." Berger, supra note 67, at 107
n.28 (internal citation omitted). Non-permanent-residents named in a certificate are automatically
detained. Id. at 107. However, after 120 days, if they have not been removed, a judge may order them
released. CANADIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, BACKGROUNDER No. 14, CERTIFICATES UNDER
THE IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE PROTECTION ACT (2005), http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/newsroom/
backgrounders/backgrounder I4.asp.
99. Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), (1998) 1 S.C.R. 982,
para. 12 (citing statutory grounds for refoulement of a refugee who might create a danger to Canadian
security). Those named in security certificates may file for a pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA). See
CANADIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, supra note 97. This, too, is reviewed by the Federal Court
of Appeal. However, the government may override a PRRA by issuing a danger opinion.
100. Ahani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), (2002) 1 S.C.R. 72, 82.
101. Almrei v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), (2005) 3 F.C. 142, 167, para.
33; see also Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) v. Mahjoub, (2001) 4 F.C. 644; Jaballah v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2004] F.C. 299.
102. James C. Hathaway & Colin J. Harvey, Framing Refugee Protection in the New World
Disorder, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 257, 288 (2001).
103. See, e.g., Pushpanathan, (1998) 1 S.C.R. 982, para. 12.
104. See Supreme Court Hears Security Certificate Challenge, CBCNEwS, June 13, 2006,
http://www.cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2006/06/l 3/security-certificates.html.
105. See, e.g., G. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, SIAC Appeal No. SC/2/2002 (Oct. 29,
2003), available at http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/legalprof/judgments/siac/outcomes/
sc22002g.htm; G. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, SIAC Bail Appl. No. SC/2/2002 (May 20,
2003), available at http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/legalprof/judgments/siac/outcomes/scglOg.htm
(granting bail); Rideh v. Secretary of State, SIAC Appeal No. SCB/3 (Jan. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/legalprof/judgments/siac/outcomes/rideh 170105.htm (granting
bail); see also Sophie Robin-Olivier, Citizens and Noncitizens in Europe: European Union Measures
Against Terrorism After September 11, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 197, 206 (2005) ("[T]he Court of
Appeal upheld a SIAC decision that deemed a detention unjustified because it was based on unreliable
evidence that should not have been used.").
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[before] a court."' 10 6 Not only may SIAC order release on bond, but it may also
force the government to grant a non-citizen asylum. Although under both
domestic law and the Refugee Convention, the United Kingdom can refuse a
dangerous non-citizen asylum, such non-citizens may petition SIAC for
relief.107
C. Conclusions
While Canada and the United Kingdom impose substantial restrictions
on defendants' access to secret evidence during criminal trials, those nations
have steadily relaxed the rules governing immigration cases. For instance,
under the prior version of Canada's immigration law, all non-citizens named
in security certificates were subject to mandatory detention.' 08 But under the
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of 2001,109 Canada's most recent
comprehensive revision of its immigration laws, non-citizens may apply to a
federal judge for release on bail. 110 Likewise, prior to the decision of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Chahal v. United Kingdom, I 'I
not only could the U.K. Secretary of State order a non-citizen deported on the
basis of secret evidence, 112 but he also could use that same evidence to justify
detention or refoulement. 113 The only recourse permitted a non-citizen at the
time was appeal to an advisory panel which did not even have to inspect the
secret evidence upon which the government had relied. 1 4 After Chahal, SIAC
was established. The United States has taken the opposite tack: It has affirmed
its commitment to confrontation in criminal cases while reducing the
protections it affords non-citizens. Indeed, federal judges have emphasized
that the attacks of September 11 wrought changes to immigration law--one
106. A. v. Secretary of State, [2005] UKHL 71, [25], (2005) 3 W.L.R. 1249; cf. R (West) v.
Parole Board, [2005] UKHL 1, (2005) 1 W.L.R. 350.
107. WALKER, supra note 18, at 236 ("[T]he Secretary of State may certify that a person is
excluded from refugee status... [but] the SIAC must... deliberat[e] upon the asylum appeal.").
108. Immigration Act, R.S.C., ch. 1-2 (1985), amended by 1988 S.C., ch. 36, § 40.1(7)(b)
(Can.) ("[T]he person named in the certificate shall .. .continue to be detained until the person is
removed from Canada.").
109. See Catherine Dauvergne, Evaluating Canada's New Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act in Its Global Context, 41 ALBERTA L. REv. 7255 (2003), for a discussion of the changes wrought by
IRPA.
110. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. Likewise, under the prior law the government
could rely on secret evidence to cut off the appeal rights of entire groups of non-citizens. See Law v.
Canada (Solictor General) (1983) 2 F.C. 181 (Can.).
11. App. No. 22414/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413 (1997) (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts.).
112. See, e.g., R. v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs exparte Hosenball, (1977) 1 W.L.R.
766; Clive Walker, Constitutional Governance and Special Powers Against Terrorism: Lessons from the
United Kingdom's Prevention of Terrorism Acts, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 19-20 (1997) (citing
R. v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs ex parte Stitt for the proposition that "there is some judicial
support for the view that any decision by a Secretary of State to exclude may be treated as non-
justiciable").
113. See Chahal, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. paras. 64, 153.
114. Statement of Immigration Rules for Control after Entry, 1973, H.C. 82, rule 42, quoted in
R v. Home Secretary ex parte Hosenball, (1977) 1 W.L.R. 766, 774-75 (D.C.) (Eng.) ("Nor is there a
right of appeal ... where a deportation order is made on the ground that the Secretary of State deems the
person's deportation to be... in the interests of national security ....").
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court admitted, "[w]e are not inclined to impede investigators ' 15-and courts
have grown steadily less solicitous of the confrontation rights of non-citizens.
This distinction should not be overdrawn. Nevertheless, I believe two
structural differences between the United States, on the one hand, and Canada
and the United Kingdom, on the other, are noteworthy. First, although in
criminal cases involving secret evidence U.S. judges exercise considerably
greater responsibility than do their Canadian and U.K. counterparts, in
immigration cases the reverse is true. In criminal cases, U.S. judges have
arrogated to themselves the primary responsibility for assessing the merit of
any claim to secrecy the government makes. Whether under the Roviaro
standard-which dictates when the government must provide a criminal
defendant with the name of the government's informant-or under CIPA, it is
for the judge to decide the admissibility of evidence. 116 By contrast, in
Canadian and U.K. criminal cases, judges often take the word of police
officers or government officials, rather than determining on their own the
relevance of evidence and the security threat its disclosure might pose. 1'7 For
instance, in Re Gougen, a Canadian trial court accepted a public interest
certificate filed by the Deputy Solicitor-General without inspecting the
material for which he sought the privilege. 1 8 As Ian Leigh has explained, "in
Canada... it has been noticeable that the courts have refused to inspect unless
the defence demonstrates relevance to a high degree."
' 119
Yet in immigration cases, the opposite is true. In Canada and the United
Kingdom, judges control the evidence. As the court noted in Re Harakat, the
Canadian Parliament chose not to permit non-citizens (or their attorneys)
access to secret evidence in part because judges were expected to test the
government's secret evidence on their behalf.q2° By contrast, in the United
States, judges and administrators do not always carefully inspect the secret
evidence on which the government relies. For instance, in In re Haddam, one
BIA judge noted that the Immigration Judge who had first handled the case
had not adequately "examine[d] [secret] evidence."' 121
Second, although in criminal cases the U.S. Congress has sharply
distinguished rules governing confidential information from those that apply
to national security information, in immigration cases, it has been the
Canadian and U.K. Parliaments that have engaged in such fine-grained law-
115. Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542, 555 (3d Cir. 2001).
116. See, e.g., United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d 203, 209 (1st Cir. 1985) (Breyer, J.)
(advocating in camera review when the government wishes to use secret evidence); In re Washington
Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 393 (4th Cir. 1986) (discussing the history of CIPA).
117. See, e.g., Patrick Birkenshaw, Government and the End of Its Tether: Matrix Churchill
and the Scott Report, 23 J. L. & Soc. 406, 411 (1996) (noting that judges are likely to "enforce the
government's say so on the public interest to protect what government wishe[s] to keep secret or
confidential").
118. See Gougen v. Gibson, (1983) 2 F.C. 463, para. 8 (Can.); see also Canada Evidence Act,
R.S.C., Ch. C-5, 39 (1985) (precluding court review of Cabinet documents where a minister certifies in
writing that the "information constitutes a confidence of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada");
Kevork v. The Queen, (1984) 2 F.C. 753 (Can.).
119. lan Leigh, Reforming Public Interest Immunity, 2 WEB J. CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES (1995),
http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/articles2/eigh2.html.
120. (2005) 2 F.C. 416, 443 (Can.).
121. 2000 BIA LEXIS 20, at *118 (BIA) (Hurwitz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
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making. For instance, CIPA was designed to deal with the particular problems
attendant on the use of national security information in criminal cases. 122 By
contrast, in Canada and the United Kingdom, public interest immunity covers
both the mundane and the dangerous. Yet with respect to immigration law,
Canadian and U.K. Parliaments have distinguished national security
information from confidential information. For instance, in Canada, only those
who are suspected of terrorism or serious criminality may be named in
security certificates. 123 And Parliament and the Canadian courts have taken
great pains to define the meanings of "terrorism" and "criminality."' 124 By
contrast, although Congress has promulgated particular rules to govern the use
of national security information, 125 the INS and courts have disdained that
process. Instead, they have invoked the laws governing confidential
information. 126
III. MOTIVE ANALYSIS
I believe these practical and structural differences can be simply
explained: The United States has begun to invoke immigration law as pretext
to justify the detention and interrogation of suspicious non-citizens. If the
United States arrests a non-citizen for a minor immigration violation, it may
rely on secret evidence to justify incarceration or investigation. By contrast, if
it arrests the same non-citizen as a criminal terrorist, it cannot rely on that
evidence. As the Attorney General has said of suspected terrorists, "[i]f [they]
overstay [their] visas even by one day," 127 they will be arrested on
immigration charges. Likewise, a report filed by the Office of the Inspector
General concludes that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the INS
in New York City made little attempt to distinguish between aliens who were
legitimate subjects of the post-9/1 1 investigation and those whose illegal
immigration status the FBI discovered coincidentally.1 28 As Philip Heymann
has argued, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the government is using
immigration law as a tool of investigative or preventive detention.129
122. See S. Rep. No. 96-823, at 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294, 4294. For an
excellent overview of CIPA, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Critical Review of the Classified Information
Procedures Act, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 277 (1986).
123. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 27, § 77 (Can.).
124. See Audrey Macklin, Borderline Security, in THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 17,
at 383.
125. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
126. See Tom Brune, US. Evades Curbs in Terror Law, NEWSDAY, Apr. 26, 2002, at A 17
(noting that the U.S. has never convened the ATRC).
127. Dan Eggen, Tough Anti-Terror Campaign Pledged; Ashcroft Tells Mayors He Will Use
New Law to Fullest Extent, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2001, at Al.
128. THE SEPTEMBER I I DETAINEES, supra note 8, at 196.
129. PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT WAR 92
(2003) ("There are about 20 million aliens ... a high percentage of whom are at least technically in
violation of one or another visa regulation. But that fact is now being used as a device ... for purposes
of interrogation or incapacitation."); see also MINORITY STAFF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION OF
THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM 108TH CONG., REPORT ON SECRECY IN THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 65-69 (2004), available at http://www.democrats.reform.house.gov/Documents/
20050317180908-35215.pdf; Raquel Aldana, The September 11 Immigration Detentions and
Unconstitutional Executive Legislation, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 5, 5 (2005).
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If it is true that the United States has used immigration law as a
pretext since September 1 1 to justify ready recourse to secret evidence, the
central puzzle of Part I-why the United States treats secret evidence in
criminal cases so differently than it does similar information in immigration
cases-has an easy explanation. Canada and the United Kingdom have to
prosecute terrorists. They have, therefore, developed effective ways of
conducting such trials. By contrast, in the United States there has been little
need to develop such rules, since the United States has been able to rely on
immigration law to justify the detention and interrogation of suspected
terrorists.
A. Policing the Civil-Criminal Line in the United States, Canada, and
the United Kingdom
In the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, courts and
legislatures distinguish "civil" police action from law enforcement. In the
United States, for instance, although police must have probable cause to
search or detain a suspect, they need only have reasonable suspicion to
respond to an emergency. 130 U.S. courts enforce these distinctions, 131 as do
their Canadian and U.K. counterparts. In Canada and the United Kingdom,
detention pending investigation is of dubious legal status. 132 And
"investigative hearings" may seldom be used to generate evidence. 133 In
general, police officers in all three nations are expected either to investigate,
arrest, and charge, or to confine and care for; they cannot do both
simultaneously. As the U.S. Supreme Court has observed, police may not "use
an interrogating process at police headquarters in order to determine whom
130. For instance, in Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969), the Supreme Court rejected a
police practice of bringing suspects to the stationhouse for fingerprinting and questioning before the
police had probable cause to arrest any of them for commission of a crime. See also Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991) (holding that prompt probable cause determinations are
constitutionally required). Section 412 of the Patriot Act permits the Attorney General to detain a non-
citizen pending investigation, but only for seven days and subject to judicial oversight. Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
(USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 § 412(a), 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §
1226a(a)(5) (Supp. 1. 2001)). Nevertheless, even this exception is carefully limited. See Shirin Sinnar,
Note, Patriotic or Unconstitutional? The Mandatory Detention of Aliens Under the USA Patriot Act, 55
STAN. L. REv. 1419, 1434 (2003) (noting that the USA PATRIOT Act specifically permits non-citizens
to seek habeas corpus relief from detention); Developments in the Law-Plight of the Tempest-Tost:
Indefinite Detention of Deportable Aliens, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1915, 1933 (2002) ("To continue
detention beyond seven days, the government must begin deportation proceedings or bring criminal
charges against the alien.").
131. For instance, in Jackson v. Indiana, the Court found unconstitutional a scheme that
permitted the indefinite detention of those temporarily unable to stand trial. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
132. See Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 29(1), sched. 8 (U.K.); R. v. Precourt, (1976) 18 O.R.2d
714; Gary T. Trotter, The Anti-Terrorism Bill and Preventative Restraints on Liberty, in THE SECURITY
OF FREEDOM, supra note 17, at 239, 243-43 (noting that Bill C-36 permits "at least 72 hours detention
prior to a bail hearing" but requires that "once an individual has been brought before a justice of the
peace... the individual should not be returned to the local police lock-up for further interrogation"); J.J.
Rowe, The Terrorism Act 2000, 2001 Crim. L.R. 527, 533-34.
133. See Martin L. Friedland, Police Powers in Bill C-36, in THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM, supra
note 17, at 269, 277-78 ("There is, of course, a danger that the hearing will be used against a prime
suspect . . . .If the proceedings are being used to compel testimony from a prime suspect, then the
proceedings ... [they] can be challenged under the existing law."); see also British Columbia (Securities
Commission) v. Branch, (1995) 2 S.C.R. 3.
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they should charge." 134 "The distinction between a civil penalty and a criminal
penalty is of some constitutional import."
'1 35
In all three nations, immigration laws are civil, not criminal. 136 In the
United States, for instance, courts permit immigration officers to ignore
certain procedural strictures, 137 but only because removal (and detention
pending removal) are prospective, non-punitive remedies. 138 One might
therefore expect that courts in all three nations would test the legitimacy of
claims to immigration authority. But as I demonstrate in the next section, that
is only true of Canada and the United Kingdom.
B. Attending to-and Ignoring-Motive
As Peter Schuck noted twenty years ago, "[i]mmigration has long been a
maverick." 139 U.S. courts do not enforce the line between "civil" and
"criminal" in immigration cases. 140 For instance, in Abel v. United States,'4 '
the government admitted that it had arrested Abel, a non-citizen, on
immigration charges because it lacked the evidence necessary to bring
espionage charges against him but hoped to glean such evidence after taking
him into custody. 142 The Supreme Court, although it was at pains to
emphasize that "[t]he deliberate use by the Government of an [immigration]
warrant for the purpose of gathering evidence in a criminal case must meet
stem resistance by the courts," 14 3 nevertheless approved the government's
actions.
134. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 456 (1957); see also United States v. Awadallah,
349 F.3d 42, 59 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[I]t would be improper for the government to use § 3144 [providing for
the civil detention of material witnesses] for other ends, such as the detention of persons suspected of
criminal activity ....").
135. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980). The Supreme Court's recent decision in
Brigham City v. Stuart, 126 S. Ct. 1943 (2006), does not undermine my argument. Although the court
refused to inquire of police officers' subjective motivations, the court did ask whether the officers "had
an objectively reasonable basis for believing" that an emergency was ongoing, id. at 1949, and reiterated
the importance of inquiry into subjective programmatic purposes, id. at 1948.
136. See, e.g., United States v. Yacoubian, 24 F.3d 1, 10 (9th Cir. 1994) (refusing to apply Ex
Post Facto Clause to deportation proceedings); Fayemi v. Bureau of Immigration and Custom
Enforcement, No. CV-04-1935, 2004 WL 1161532, at *1-2, 4 (E.D.N.Y. May 24, 2004) (refusing to
apply Eighth Amendment). For a discussion of the difference between immigration law and criminal law
in Canada and the United Kingdom, see Kent Roach, Must We Trade Rights for Security? The Choice
Between Smart, Harsh, or Proportionate Security Strategies in Canada and Britain, 27 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2151, 2186-87 (2006).
137. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (Miranda and exclusionary rule);
cf Galvar v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) (discussing an ex post facto immigration law).
138. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038.
139. Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1
(1984).
140. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently intimated that a police officer need not have probable
cause to suspect an immigration violation in order to question a non-citizen about his status. See
generally Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005).
141. 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
142. United States v. Abel, 258 F.2d 485, 495 n.9 (2d Cir. 1958) (quoting N.Y. HERALD
TRIBUNE, Aug. 12, 1957, at I ("'We were well aware of what he was when we picked him up,' Gen.
Swing said. 'Our idea at the time was to hold him as long as we could."')).
143. Abel, 362 U.S. at 226.
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In part, this is due to the increasing interrelationship between criminal
law enforcement and immigration processes. 144 Congress now permits, for
instance, "judicial removal" after criminal trials. 145 Yet it is also due to
judicial self-abnegation. Although there are persuasive legal reasons to believe
a judge should not circumvent the procedural protections afforded all non-
citizens by the INA by herself ordering a non-citizen deported, 146 at least one
court has sanctioned such behavior, perhaps out of deference to congressional
expertise in immigration law. 147 Some courts believe that "[t]he Department
of Justice is in a far better position than are generalist judges to evaluate, ,148 T
[immigration policies]. . 148 They are simply not interested in "smoking
out" illicit motives.
The logic of those courts is at once impeccable and misleading. Fiallo v.
Bell and Mathews v. Diaz counsel that courts should generally refrain from
trying to 'smoke out' improper government purposes in immigration cases. In
those cases, the Supreme Court upheld seemingly arbitrary classifications
among and between non-citizens. In Fiallo, the Supreme Court found
constitutionally unproblematic a law that authorized the distribution of a
benefit to legitimate, but not illegitimate, children of U.S. citizens. 149
Likewise, in Diaz, the Court upheld "statutory discrimination within the class
of aliens .... ,150
At the same time, it is not accurate to say that this is the usual way
courts assess government policies. 151 Consider the following thought
144. See Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-
September 11th 'Pale of Law,' 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 639, 660-61, (2004); Daniel Kanstroom,
Deportation, Social Control and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases,
113 HARV. L. REv. 1890, 1891 (2000); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration
and Crime Control After September 11th, 25 B. C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 88 (2005). Congress has, for
instance, steadily expanded the number of non-citizen criminal defendants subject to immigration
consequences if convicted. See Susan L. Pilcher, Justice Without a Blindfold: Criminal Proceedings and
the Alien Defendant, 50 ARK. L. REv. 269, 272 (1997); see also, e.g., Immigration Act of 1990
(IMMACT) § 501, 104 Stat. 4978, 5048 (1990) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(43) (2000));
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) § 441, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2000); Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) § 303, 8 U.S.C. § 1226
(2000). By encouraging local police officers to enforce immigration law, the federal government has
further linked criminal and immigration processes. See Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police
Enforcement ofImmigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084 (2004); Eric Schmitt, Administration Split
on Local Role in Terror Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2002, at Al. Even local prisons and immigration
authorities seem in cahoots. Michael Welch, The Role of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in
the Prison-Industrial Complex, 27 SOC. JUST. 73, 78, 80 (2000). Canada and the United Kingdom have
also followed this trend-toward the elimination of any distinction between immigration policy and
criminal law enforcement-to some extent. See Roach, supra note 11, at 11-17.
145. 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c) (2000).
146. United States v. Xiang, 77 F.3d 771 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Quaye, 57 F.3d 447
(5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Sanchez, 923 F.2d 236, 237 (1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
147. United States v. Chukwura, 5 F.3d 1420, 1423-24 (11 th Cir. 1993).
148. David A. Martin, Offshore Detainees and the Role of Courts After Rasul v. Bush: The
Underappreciated Virtues of Deferential Review, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 125, 158 (2005). Compare
Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2005) (Posner, J.) (collecting cases and alleging
systemic failure on the part of the BIA), with Kumar v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1019, 1036 (9th Cir. 2006)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (refusing to "'whittle away the authority and discretion of immigrations judges
and the BIA"' (quoting Jahed v. INS, 356 F.3d 991, 1007 (9th Cir. 2004)).
149. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
150. 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976); see also id. at 83 (discussing the "wholly irrational" test).
15 1. Indeed, as Peter Schuck has put it, "classical immigration law has essentially neutralized
[the equal protection] principle." Schuck, supra note 141, at 22.
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experiment: Say the New York Police Department (NYPD) promulgated a
policy "denying desk appearance tickets to persons arrested for minor offenses
allegedly committed at demonstrations" while permitting them to those
arrested for the same offenses in other places and at other times.1 52 Would this
be constitutional? My guess is that a court would strike it down, and it may be
that the NYPD concurs with my assessment: it withdrew the real policy upon
which I base my hypothetical shortly after the New York Civil Liberties
Union brought suit to enjoin it."' But this policy is the analytical equivalent
of the INS policy at issue in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee, a case in which the Supreme Court refused to consider whether
the INS had engaged in selective prosecution. 154 The Court sanctioned the
arrest and removal of the "L.A. Eight," two Palestinian LPRs and six
Palestinian temporary visa holders, who had been under long-term FBI
surveillance for their membership in a terrorist organization,' 55 the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, despite the First Amendment protection
afforded for membership in radical organizations.'
56
Unlike in the United States, in Canada courts are willing to interrogate
government motives in immigration cases. For instance, in Little Sisters Book
& Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 157 a bookstore selling gay
and lesbian erotica brought suit challenging the motives of the government
agents responsible for interdicting obscene material. Relying on the fact that
"only 14 charges of obscenity were laid in four years in British Columbia
while approximately 35,000 prohibitions were imposed by Customs in the
same period" and noting that "[t]he evidence here . . . did not justify the
targeting of Little Sisters,"158 the Supreme Court of Canada concluded, "[t]he
administration of the Act ... was oppressive .... ,159 Indeed, even though the
program was ostensibly legal-customs agents in Canada have the authority
to search and seize contraband, including erotic materials-after testing the
interdiction program for means-ends rationality, the Court concluded that the
program was actually meant to harass buyers and sellers of homosexual
erotica.
152. See Press Release, New York Civil Liberties Union, New York City Announces
Withdrawal of Demonstrator-Detention Policy Challenged by NYCLU in Lawsuit (July 13, 2001),
http://www.nyclu.org/news2001.html.
153. Id.
154. 525 U.S. 471, 491-92 (1999) ("[T]he Government does not offend the Constitution by
deporting [an out-of-status alien] for the additional reason that it believes him to be a member of an
organization that supports terrorist activity.").
155. William C. Banks, The "L.A. Eight" and Investigation of Terrorist Threats in the United
States, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 479, 485 (2000) (noting that the lower court had found that "the
INS sought deportation on the basis of the plaintiff's mere membership"); see also Berta Esperanza
HernAndez-Truyol, Nativism, Terrorism, and Human Rights-The Global Wrongs ofReno v. American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 31 COLUM. HUM RTs. L. REv. 521 (2000).
156. For my views on this point, see generally Stephen Townley, The Hydraulics of Fighting
Terrorism, 29 HAMLINE L. REv. 65 (2006).
157. (2000)2 S.C.R. 1120.
158. Id. at 1187.
159. Id. at 1154. For more information on this case, see Janine Benedet, Little Sisters Book and
Art Emporium v. Minister of Justice: Sex Equality and the Attack on R. v. Butler, 39 OsGoODE HALL
L.J. 187 (2001); Jo-Anne Pickel, Taking Big Brother to Court: Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v.
Canada (Minister of Justice), 59 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REv. 349 (2001); Bruce Ryder, The Little Sisters
Case, Administrative Censorship, and Obscenity Law, 39 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 207 (2001).
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This U.S. "immigration exception" explains the secret evidence cases.
U.S. litigants have demanded that the INS justify its use of secret evidence
against non-citizens charged with visa overstays and other minor immigration
violations (as opposed to terrorism-related offenses). 160 The INS has
demurred, 16 sometimes even filing its limited answers under seal. 162 And
courts have not pressed the point. For instance, in Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, the
Third Circuit noted:
Such a criticism implies that the government may only utilize information against an
individual in a civil context, such as in deportation procedures, if it also intends to
commence criminal proceedings against that same individual. Such a fettering of the
Executive Branch has no support in either case law or statute.1
63
By contrast, the House of Lords, in its famous decision in A. v. Secretary
of State for the Home Department, held that those provisions of the ATCSA
permitting the United Kingdom indefinitely to detain non-citizens who were
deemed deportable for security reasons but who could not be safely placed in
another country violated the European Convention on Human Rights. The
Law Lords reprimanded the government, explaining, "the choice of an
immigration measure to address a security problem had the inevitable result of
failing adequately to address that problem (by allowing non-UK suspected
terrorists to leave the country with impunity and leaving British suspected
terrorists at large)."' 164
C. Explanations for the Difference
In this Section, I present and assess three possible explanations for this
difference between the United States, on the one hand, and Canada and the
United Kingdom, on the other. I conclude that although each explanation
sheds light on the problem, and although each is related to the others, none is
fully persuasive, since despite the distinctions I draw between the three
160. See, e.g., Ricardo J. Bascuas, The Unconstitutionality of "Hold Until Cleared":
Reexamining Material Witness Detentions in the Wake of the September 1 1th Dragnet, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 677 (2005); Anthony Lewis, First They Came for the Muslims.. . The Justice Department's War
on Immigrants, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 1, 2003, at A12; Harry Litman, Pretextual Prosecution, 92 GEO.
L.J. 1135, 1137 (2004).
161. Cf Viet Dinh et al., Life After 9/11: Issues Affecting the Courts and the Nation, 51 U.
KAN. L. REV. 219, 224 (2003) (transcript of 2002 Tenth Circuit Judicial Conference, remarks by
Assistant Attorney General Viet Dinh, Conference Proceedings); Attorney General John Ashcroft,
Remarks at the U.S. Mayor's Conference (Oct. 25, 2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/
ag/speeches/200 I/agcrisisremarks 1 0_25.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
162. See, e.g., Motion to File Under Seal, M.K.B. v. Warden, 540 U.S. 1213 (2004) (No. 03-
6747), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2003/Oresponses/2003-6747.resp.html.
163. Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542, 553 (3d Cir. 2001); see also In re Ruiz-Massie, 22
I. & N. Dec. 883, 844 (BIA 1999) ("It might be argued that a record of criminal conviction presents a
different case because it is based on a determination of guilt following a formal judicial proceeding, as
opposed to the Secretary of State's unilateral judgment regarding adverse foreign policy consequences.
That argument, however, is properly directed at Congress[] ...."); In re Parviz Ghadimi, 2004 WL
2374513 (BIA 2004) ("The Immigration Judge's comment that the evidence is hearsay three times
removed is somewhat of an exaggeration . . . . For the most part those involved in providing the
evidence were Federal Bureau of Investigation agents and there is a legal presumption that a government
official performs his duty properly ... ).
164. A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] UKHL 56, [43].
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nations, the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom remain
qualitatively similar.
I. History and Current Events
U.S. citizens are often suspicious of the President. For instance,
Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in response
to complaints about government misconduct.165 Likewise, many Americans
believe that prosecutors and police exercise too much discretion, and exercise
it poorly; 166 the trope here is the story of Rodney King. 167 By contrast, in
Canada and the United Kingdom, the public generally trusts the Prime
Minister. 168 Moreover, prosecutors (and presumably police) are generally
perceived as public servants. 169
However, during emergencies, these trends seem not to hold. On the one
hand, "the [U.S.] government enjoys an unusually high level of trust among
citizens," 17  and advocates of the "new community policing believe that,
during crime waves, police should have more power, not less. 7 1 On the other
hand, U.K. citizens rebelled against their government's tight secrecy rules'
72
after a series of Iraq-related crises in the mid-1990s, 173 including the notorious
"Matrix Churchill" trial; 174 citizens weighed the government's response to the
Iraq emergency, and found it wanting. U.K. citizens have since become more
suspicious of government demands for power during emergencies.
165. See Susan N. Herman, The USA PATRIOT Act and the Submajoritarian Fourth
Amendment, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 67, 116 (2006) ("The Church Commission's work led to the
enactment of FISA ...."). See generally COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1975) (commonly referred to as the "Rockefeller Commission Report");
SELECT COMM. To STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMM.
To STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. No. 94-755 (1976).
166. See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 451-54 (1992)
(discussing allegations that prosecutors suppressed evidence in various high-profile cases).
167. Cf Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1119 (2000) (discussing how
a few, widely-publicized "'bad-apples' . . . undermine the integrity of police, prosecutors, and the
criminal justice system in general" in the public's eyes).
168. Cf Leigh, supra note 50, at 129 (noting that Canada's "record of political persecution
during the cold war is generally considered to have been more fortunate than that of of its southern
neighbour").
169. See, e.g., Randall v. The Queen, [2002] UKPC 19, [10(l)], (2002) 1 W.L.R. 2237.
170. Eric A. Posner, Political Trials in Domestic and International Law, 55 DUKE L.J. 75, 102
(2005).
171. Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO.
L.J. 1153, 1164 (1998); see also Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public
Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551,562 (1997).
172. See generally Debra L. Silverman, Note & Comment, Freedom ofInformation: Will Blair
be Able to Break the Walls of Secrecy in Britain?, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 471, 490-91 (1997).
173. Sir Richard Scott, Vice-Chancellor of the Supreme Court, Earl Grey Memorial Lecture,
The Use of Public Interest Immunity in Criminal Cases (Feb. 29, 1996), http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/
1996/issue2/scott2.html. See generally Dawn Oliver, The Scott Report, 1996 Pub. L. 357.
174. DAVID LEIGH, BETRAYED: THE REAL STORY OF THE MATRIX CHURCHILL TRIAL (1993);
Silverman, supra note 172; see also Patrick Birkinshaw, Government and the End of Its Tether: Matrix
Churchill and the Scott Report, 23 J. L. & SoC. 406, 407 (1996); lan Leigh, Reforming Public Interest
Immunity, WEB. J. OF CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES, available at http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/articles2/leigh2.html
(1995). Cf Adam Tomkins, Public Interest Immunity After Matrix Churchill, 1993 Pub. L. 650, 666-68.
During the mid-1990s, trust in the police also began to decline. See Mike Redmayne, Criminal Justice
Act 2003 (1) Disclosure and its Discontents, 2004 Crim. L.R. 441, 445.
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Perhaps Canadian and U.K. nationals are less affected by emergencies
because they have longer experience fighting terrorism. 175 As one author has
put it, "Londoners endured repeated bombings" and learned to adjust. 176 Or
perhaps Hollywood's persistent dramatization of threats to the United States
has engendered a stronger emotional reaction in U.S. citizens than they might
otherwise evince.' 77 So, one potential explanation for my observations is that
U.S. courts may be reluctant to engage in motive analysis because they are
simply more willing to "trust" the government during a time of crisis, whereas
Canadian and U.K. courts worry about repeating past mistakes. 1
78
2. Structure of Government
Both Canada and the United Kingdom are parliamentary democracies,'
79
without an independent executive, whereas the United States has a
presidential (tripartite) structure. This has no obvious explanatory force-in
fact, one might predict that courts in a parliamentary system would be more
suspicious of government attempts to use secret evidence. 180 However,
differences in how the machinery of government runs may have first-order-
and appear likely to have second-order--effects on government secrecy.
First, in a presidential system, the President and his foreign policy
officers enjoy considerable democratic legitimacy,'81 to which the judiciary
may feel compelled to defer. 182 Moreover, proponents of the "unitary
executive" theory 183 argue that the United States' separation of powers-
which gives the President little role in lawmaking-requires courts to respect
executive control over such matters as foreign policy. By contrast, in a
parliamentary system, foreign policy personnel are often bureaucrats' 84 and
may not even be members of the governing party. 185 Consequently, to the
extent that their actions are susceptible of judicial review as rules promulgated
175. Cf William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties in
Times of Security Crises, Address at the Law School of Hebrew University in Jerusalem (Dec. 22,
1987), in 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. I 1 (1988).
176. Jonathan H. Marks, 9/11 + 3/11 + 7/7 = ?: What Counts in Counterrorism, 37 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 559, 565 (2006).
177. Id. at 583-84. Consider, for instance, the range of 9/l-related productions, including
WORLD TRADE CENTER (Paramount Pictures 2006) and UNITED 93 (Fox Broadcasting Company 2006).
178. Michael P. O'Connor & Celia M. Rumann, Into the Fire: How to Avoid Getting Burned by
the Same Mistakes Made Fighting Terrorism in Northern Ireland, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1657, 1662
(2003); see also COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, No EMERGENCY, No EMERGENCY
LAW: EMERGENCY LEGISLATION RELATED TO NORTHERN IRELAND-THE CASE FOR REPEAL (1995).
179. For one explanation of Canada's political system, see generally PETER W. HOGG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA (4th ed. 1997).
180. Cf Lori Fisler Damrosch, Impeachment as a Technique of Parliamentary Control over
Foreign Affairs in a Presidential System?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1525, 1553 (1999).
181. Steven G. Calabresi, The Virtues of Presidential Government: Why Professor Ackerman Is
Wrong to Prefer the German to the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 51, 58 (2001 ).
182. Cf JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
183. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994).
184. See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 690-92,
712-14 (2000) (noting "[i]t is one thing for the president ... to read statutes 'creatively'; it is quite
another for the prime minister to force long-term officials, steeped in the ethic of neutrality, to play fast
and loose").
185. Calabresi, supra note 181, at 71. But see Ackerman, supra note 184.
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by administrative agencies, 186 courts may find the sailing easier than in a
presidential system. Moreover, since the Prime Minister both makes and
executes the laws, arguments for foreign policy independence avail him
less. 187 Some limited data bear out these arguments. 18 However, other data
suggest that the executive in a parliamentary system may be as independent as
its counterpart in a presidential system,' 89 and the extent to which presidential
and parliamentary systems differ in the foreign policy realm should not be
overstated. 190
Second, and more importantly, a parliamentary system is more flexible
than a presidential one:191 One Parliament can immediately override the acts
of a prior Parliament or the rules articulated by a court. The Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, for instance, explicitly provides for such a
"legislative override."' 92 Likewise, the Human Rights Act of 1998, which
incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic U.K.
law, encourages the legislature to reconsider immediately any law questioned
by a court. 193 By contrast, in the United States, the Supreme Court has final
say on all matters of constitutional law.194 And, over the past decade, the
Supreme Court has required Congress to make ever more detailed findings to
justify legislation. 195 There are few of the incentives to legislate that there are
in Canada or the United Kingdom.
It is possible that courts in Canada and the United Kingdom are
comfortable regulating the use of secret evidence because a foreign minister
speaks with less authority than a secretary of state (or because it is easier for
courts in those countries to assess whether individual officers have abused
their authority). Or, perhaps Canadian and U.K. courts are confident that the
186. Cf Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REv. 649, 652
(2000) (describing the United States as an "international administrative state").
187. Cf Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U.
CHI. L. REV. 123, 131 (1994).
188. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 33-35
(1996) for one such view.
189. Joanna Harrington, Redressing the Democratic Deficit in Treaty Law Making:
(Re-)Establishing a Role for Parliament, 50 MCGILL L.J. 465, 468 (2005) ("The common law imposes
no legal obligation on the executive to secure the consent or approval of Parliament prior to treaty
ratification .... ).
190. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (discussing the
"very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government
in the field of international relations").
191. Douglas W. Vick, The Human Rights Act and the British Constitution, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J.
329, 336 (2002); see also id. at 339 ("[T]he basic provisions of the U.S. Constitution are certain and
stable.., while the content of the British constitution is less stable but more adaptable.").
192. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 33 (U.K.). See generally Tsvi Kahana, Understanding the
Notwithstanding Mechanism, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 221 (2002).
193. Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42, § 4 (U.K.) (providing that courts may issue a declaration
of "incompatibility" if the legislation does not comply with the Convention); see generally K.D. Ewing,
The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary Democracy, 62 MOD. L. REV. 79 (1999). If a court finds a
particular law incompatible with the Convention it is not invalid, but rather "remanded" to Parliament.
Human Rights Act, id. § 4.
194. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (declaring the "basic principle that the federal
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution").
195. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995).
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Parliament will swiftly promulgate new rules governing the use of secret
evidence should they err.
3. International Law
One final theory holds that courts in Canada and the United Kingdom
are more willing to apply international law to domestic actors than are courts
in the United States, and that it has been international law that has spurred
Canadian and U.K. courts to undertake motive analysis.
196
The United Kingdom, for instance, uses international law in three ways:
(1) in interpreting domestic law; 197 (2) in assessing the compatibility of
domestic law with the European Convention on Human Rights;198 and (3) in
applying European Community (EC) law.199 By contrast, in the United States,
both legislators and judges have expressed reluctance to use international law
to decide U.S. cases. For instance, several members of the House of
Representatives recently proposed a resolution forbidding citation to foreign
authorities in Supreme Court opinions.20'
International law-in particular, the Refugee Convention, the
Convention Against Torture (CAT), the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), and the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR)--may bear on the legality of secret evidence. For instance, Articles
13 and 14 of the ICCPR require states to disclose to non-citizens the
information upon which removal decisions are based.202
Indeed, courts in both Canada and the United Kingdom seem to have
been moved by international law in secret evidence cases. For instance, in
Sogi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), the court cited the
CAT to justify its decision to release on bail a non-citizen whom the
government sought to detain based on secret evidence. 20 3 Likewise, in R v.
196. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 73, at 99 ("[lI]t must be remembered that the court in A v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department would not have been able to hold as it did but for the HRA
1998."). But see K.D. Ewing, The Futility of the Human Rights Act, 2004 Pub. L. 829, 833 (U.K.).
197. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S.
(2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804), domestic law should be harmonized with international law to the extent
possible. See, e.g., R. v. Bow Street Metro. Stipendary Magistrate ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (2000) 1
A.C. 61 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (discussing the State Immunity Act of 1978 and noting
that "[t]he provisions of the Act 'fall to be considered against the background of ... principles of public
international law'); Andrea Bianchi, Immunity Versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case, 10 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 237 (1999). The same is true in Canada. See, e.g., United States v. Burns, (2001) 1 S.C.R. 283,
332-35 (using international law as a heuristic); Yuval Shany, How Supreme is the Supreme Law of the
Land? Comparative Analysis of the Influence of International Human Rights Treaties Upon the
Interpretation of Constitutional Texts by Domestic Courts, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 341, 363 (2006).
198. See Shany, supra note 197, at 359.
199. Domestic laws incompatible with EC law cannot stand, unlike domestic laws incompatible
with the European Convention on Human Rights, see supra note 193 & accompanying text. Shields v. E.
Coomes (Holdings) Ltd., (1978) 1 W.L.R. 1408, 1415-16.
200. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Antonin
Scalia, Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, Keynote Address at the American Society of
International Law Proceedings (Apr. 2, 2004), in 98 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PROC. 305 (2004).
201. See American Justice for American Citizens Act, H.R. 4118, 108th Cong. § 2(5) (2004).
202. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 13, 14, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 1966 U.S.T. 521, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); see also Gerald
Heckman, International Decision, Ahani v. Canada, 99 AM J. INT'L L. 669, 673 (2005).
203. (2005) 3 F.C. 517, para. 18.
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Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Gallagher, the court of
appeals invoked European Court of Justice decisions in limiting the use of
secret evidence. 204 By contrast, U.S. administrators have often been
205
unsympathetic to international law arguments.
4. Conclusion
Each explanation tells part of the story; moreover, they are related. U.S.
courts may be reluctant to advert to international law because by doing so,
they might upset the separation of powers "hydraulic"Z°6-as Roger Alford
would have it, "[i]ncluding a new source [international law] fundamentally
destabilizes the equilibrium of constitutional decision making." 20 7 By contrast,
in a nation where judges may also be legislators or foreign policy decision-
makers, the balance is not so delicate. Likewise, nations with experience
fighting terror may be inclined to endorse international law, which some see
as a potent weapon in the War on Terror.
20 8
None of these explanations, however, fully accounts for my
observations. The U.S. Supreme Court bases its Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence 20 9 on the common law of England.210 Likewise, during the lead-
up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the United Kingdom had little truck with
jus ad bellum. 211 The explanatory power, respectively, of arguments from
legal culture and international law may therefore be limited. Yet these theories
are not useless. Not only do they suggest avenues for future research, but they
also help to inform the search for potential solutions to the secret evidence
problem, since any such solution must be textured to account for differences
between the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. It is to those
potential solutions that I now turn.
IV. NEW WAYS To GOVERN SECRET EVIDENCE
In this Part, drawing upon my exploration of the differences between the
United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, I propose that those troubled
by the U.S. government's use of secret evidence take one of two different
tacks: either use international law to persuade courts to engage in motive
analysis or press Congress to regulate secret evidence (and the detention and
interrogation of terrorist suspects) more thoroughly. I also explain why the
204. (1996) 2 C.M.L.R. 951, para. 9 (U.K.).
205. See, e.g., In re D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 584 (Att'y Gen. 2003).
206. Jamil Jaffer, Congressional Control over Treaty Interpretation, 70 U. CHi. L. REV. 1093,
1097 (2003).
207. Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J.
INT'L L. 57, 57-58 (2004).
208. See, e.g., Brief of 422 Current and Former Members of the United Kingdom and European
Union Parliaments in Support of Petitioner, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2005) (No. 05-184),
available at http://www.hamdanvrumsfeld.com/HamdanParliamentariansFreshfields.pdf.
209. I distinguish "ordinary cases" from "national security cases." -
210. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); see also Robert M. Pitler, Crawford and
Beyond: Exploring the Future of the Confrontation Clause in Light of Its Past, 71 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1,
2 n.7 (2005).
211. China Mieville, Anxiety and the Sidekick State: British International Law After Iraq, 46
HARV. INT'L L.J. 441 (2005).
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current approach is flawed. This is the approach that argues that the INA is
unconstitutional to the extent that it permits the use of secret evidence either
in removal proceedings"' or to deny a non-citizen bail or asylum."'
A. Two Solutions to the Secret Evidence Problem
1. Motive Analysis
Litigants should demand, as the 9/11 Commission put it, that "the
executive . . . explain (a) that [any] power [invoked] actually materially
enhances security and (b) that there is adequate supervision of the executive's
use of the powers to ensure protection of civil liberties." 214 In short, litigants
should demand motive analysis. And, taking a page from the books of
Canadian and U.K. litigants, they should use international law to do so.
Despite conventional wisdom, U.S. courts seem more willing than ever
before to consider international law arguments, both in terrorism and in
immigration cases. First, Hamdan suggests the Supreme Court may be willing
215to apply treaty law to the War on Terror. As one group of Guantanamo
detainees argued in a recent brief, Hamdan and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,216 read
together, may imply that the Authorization for the Use of Military Force
(AUMF) incorporates international law.
2 17
Second, there are both historical and practical reasons to apply
international law in immigration cases. On the one hand, the Supreme Court
derived the plenary power doctrine-a doctrine which under-girds much of
modem immigration law-not from the Constitution but from the law of
nations.2 18 Sarah Cleveland argues, therefore, that "the authority of states over
aliens is now limited by international law protections regarding the rights of
refugees, including the fundamental prohibition against forcible return.
2 19
212. Lawrence E. Harkenrider, Comment, Due Process of 'Summary' Justice?: The Alien
Terrorist Removal Provisions Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 4
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 143, 154 (1996).
213. Jackson, supra note 14, at 59.
214. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 394-395 (2004).
215. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
216. 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004). See also Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution,
31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 6 (2006).
217. The Guantanamo Detainees' Supplemental Brief Addressing the Effect of the Supreme
Court's Opinion in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2794 (2006), on the Pending Appeals at 16-18, Al
Odah v. United States, (D.C. Cir. Aug. 8., 2006) (Nos. 05-5064, 05-5095 to 05-5116). For an academic
explanation of this argument, see generally Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of Force,
International Law, and the Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REV. 293 (2005). For my views on the
incorporation of treaty law through the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), see Stephen
Townley, Our Darwinian Law of War, Yale L.J. (The Pocket Part), Apr. 2006,
http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/04/townley.html.
218. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) ("The United States are a
sovereign and independent nation, and are vested by the Constitution with the entire control of
international relations, and with all the powers of government necessary to maintain that control and to
make it effective."); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); see also T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 862,862 (1989).
219. Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 278 (2002); see
also David Cole, The Idea of Humanity: Human Rights and Immigrants' Rights, 37 COLUM. HUM.
RIGHTS L. REV. 627, 643 (2006).
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And some court actions seem to support this proposition. In Beharry v. Reno,
the court noted, "[s]ince Congress's power over aliens rests at least in part on
international law, it should come as no shock that it may be limited by
changing international law norms. 22 ° Indeed, courts have grown somewhat
skeptical of certain government programs-in particular, the practice of
requesting automatic stays of immigration judges' orders temporarily
releasing non-citizens 221 -and have begun to use international law to
discipline the government.
222
Should U.S. courts decide to use motive analysis, they could draw on
established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 223 While courts do not
generally inquire of police officers' individual motives 224-a court will not,
for instance, find unconstitutional an arrest made out of spite if legally
acceptable 225-courts have been able to distinguish criminal law enforcement
from civil law enforcement. 226 They do this by comparing observed behavior
with the ostensible justifications for the program. For instance, in City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Court struck down an Indianapolis roadblock
scheme because it had "the primary purpose of interdicting illegal
narcotics. ' 227 Rejecting the notion that "prior cases preclude an inquiry into
the purposes of the checkpoint program," 228 the Court held that
"programmatic purposes may be relevant."§29 The Court took the same tack in
Ferguson v. City of Charleston.23 ° Courts could use the same techniques in
immigration cases. A court could reasonably ask: If so many non-citizens are
dangerous terrorists, why not convene the ATRC? Why, as a matter of policy,
hold them for visa violations?
23 1
220. 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 598 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd on other grounds, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir.
2003).
221. Zavala v. Ridge, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2004). See also Ashley v. Ridge,
288 F. Supp. 2d 662, 673 (D.N.J. 2003); see also Bezmen v. Ashcroft, 245 F. Supp. 2d 446, 451 (D.
Conn. 2003). But see Pisciotta v. Ashcroft, 311 F. Supp. 2d 445 (D.N.J. 2004). Cf Gonzales v.
O'Connell, 355 F.3d 1010, 1019-20 (7th Cir. 2004); Vacchio v. Ashcroft, 404 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 2005).
222. See Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2003) (permitting aliens to bring habeas
claims asserting rights under the Convention Against Torture); Ogbudimkpa v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 207
(3d Cir. 2003) (same).
223. Ed Aro, Note, The Pretext Problem Revisited: A Doctrinal Exploration of Bad Faith in
Search and Seizure Cases, 70 B.U. L. REV. I11l, 11 (1990).
224. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
225. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
226. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973); cf United States v. Cervantes, 219 F.3d
882, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). Courts have used these same techniques to distinguish punishment from civil
penalties for Eighth Amendment purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449-50
(1989); see also Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956). See generally Mary M.
Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies To Achieve Criminal Law Objectives:
Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1234-38
(1991).
227. 531 U.S. 32,40 (2000).
228. Id. at 45.
229. Id.
230. 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (striking down a hospital program permitting police drug-testing of
pregnant women because although ostensibly designed to protect the women's babies, the program was
deemed too intimately linked to law enforcement).
231. The facts I propose are drawn from In re Ashraf A1-Jailani, 2004 WL 1739163 (BIA
2004) (unpublished opinion).
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2. A Legislative Fix
Civil libertarians could also press Congress to regulate the use of secret
evidence as the Canadian and U.K. Parliaments have. Congress may finally be
ready to pass rules for the War on Terror,2 32 especially in light of the election
results of November 7, 2006. Some members of Congress2 33 now share the
concern of pundits234 and judges235 that the government may be misusing civil
laws (including immigration laws) to facilitate the interrogation and
incarceration of suspected terrorists.
Were Congress willing to regulate the use of secret evidence, legislators
could proceed in any one of(at least) three ways. Congress could constrain the
use of secret evidence in minimally invasive fashion by requiring the Attorney
General to certify that he personally approved each use of secret evidence and
by requiring periodic public accounting. 236 When the public's eye is on
prosecutors, it is considerably harder for them to bring pretextual charges (this
is why, according to Stuntz and Richman, local prosecutors do not
237
undercharge as frequently as federal prosecutors). In fact, government
disclosures, and the ensuing public debates, spurred Parliament to rewrite
terrorism laws in Canada and the United Kingdom.23 8
232. For instance, the Senate this summer has debated amendments to FISA that purport to
regulate warrantless wiretapping. See National Security Surveillance Act of 2006, S. 2453, 109th Cong.
§ 9(b) (2006), for the most recent draft of the bill. For the House counterpart, see Electronic Surveillance
Modernization Act, H.R. 5825, 109th Cong. § 2(b) (2006). See also James Weingarten, Recent
Development, The Detention of Enemy Combatants Act, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 181 (2006).
233. See, e.g., A Bill to Amend the Material Witness Statute to Strengthen Procedural
Safeguards, and for Other Purposes, S. 1739, 109th Cong. (2005).
234. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WITNESS TO ABUSE: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES UNDER
THE MATERIAL WITNESS LAW SINCE SEPTEMBER I1 (2005), available at http://hrw.org/reports/
2005/us0605/index.htm; see also Rachel V. Stevens, Recent Development, Center for National Security
Studies v. United States Department of Justice: Keeping the USA PATRIOT Act in Check One Material
Witness at a Time, 81 N.C. L. REV. 2157, 2159 (2004); Stacey M. Studnicki & John P. Apol, Witness
Detention and Intimidation: The History and Future of the Material Witness Law, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
483 (2002).
235. See, e.g., In re Application of the United States for Material Witness Warrant, 214 F.
Supp. 2d 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (describing how the FBI detained an Egyptian national as a material
witness and induced him to confess to a crime he did not commit).
236. Cf State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992 (1983) (invalidating
roadblock because of its unilateral establishment by patrolman); 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2000) (provision of
Title Ill requiring that all requests for wiretap orders be authorized by high-level prosecutors); see also
Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: How Do the
French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 CAL. L. REV. 542, 556-57 (1990)
(recommending "requiring supervisory-level approval for ... critical police actions"). In this way, my
proposal parallels the Detention of Enemy Combatants Act. See H.R. 1076, 109th Cong. (2005).
237. Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the Political
Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 605 (2005) ("[P]olitically accountable
local district attorneys must spend the bulk of their time enforcing a small number of serious crimes....
That is not a recipe for pretextual prosecution."). For an excellent historical discussion of the power of
transparency, see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 10-18, Gilmore v. Gonzales, No. 06-211 (Aug.
2006).
238. See, e.g., SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT, COUNTER-TERRORISM
POWERS: RECONCILING SECURITY AND LIBERTY IN AN OPEN SOCIETY: A DISCUSSION PAPER, 2004, Cm.
6147, available at http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document!cm6l/6147/6147.htm
(noting that "[w]hile it would be possible to seek other powers to detain British citizens who may be
involved in international terrorism it would be a very grave step. The Government believes that such
draconian powers would be difficult to justify"); National Security Committee of Parliamentarians Act,
2005, Bill C-81, §§ 13-14 (Can.) (first reading complete) (would establish a committee to review the
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More ambitiously, Congress could solve the underlying problem by
permitting the government to detain both citizens and non-citizens for
investigation or to prevent commission of a terrorist act. Many countries
permit limited investigative detention.239 For instance, in Northern Ireland, a
constable may arrest on suspicion, 240 and the exercise of this power is not
subject to judicial supervision. 24 1 Some countries, including Canada, also
permit preventive detention. 242 Such laws might be acceptable in the United
States. In fact, the USA PATRIOT Act already permits detention pending
investigation or as prophylaxis. But to work, any such law would have to have
strict limits 243 and would have to be exclusive. For models, Congress could
look to the U.K. Terrorism Act of 2006245 and the Prevention of Terrorism
246Act 2005 (PTA). The PTA, for instance, permits the government to issue
control orders (e.g., orders confining a suspect to his home, or to a particular
town or city). These come in two shades: derogating and non-derogating. The
former would, other things being equal, violate the European Convention on
Human Rights; 24 7 such orders may only be issued by a court after a full,
adversary hearing248 and are subject to periodic review. L
Finally, Congress could reduce the incentives to use immigration law to
fight terrorism. It could establish a "wall" between immigration and law
enforcement, just as it has between the intelligence community and
prosecutors. 25 There are several ways to build such a wall. Congress could
require that the Attorney General certify that all secret evidence he sought or
gathered was tied to the immigration charge pressed-creating a nexus
requirement like the one that governed requests for warrantless wiretaps until
recently.25' Congress could also require immigration judges to exclude and
"framework for national security in Canada"); Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, chs. 2, 14(3), (5). For
an excellent discussion of increased transparency in Canada and the U.K., see Roach, supra note 136, at
2167-72.
239. Frase, supra note 236, at 576 (noting that in France "defendants may be held in
investigatory detention (garde a vue) for up to forty-eight hours without probable cause, judicial
approval, or mandatory court appearance"); Jonathan Grebinar, Responding to Terrorism: How Must A
Democracy Do It? A Comparison of Israeli and American Law, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 261, 265 (2003);
Roach, supra note 136, at 2167-72. Such laws are usually applicable both to citizens and non-citizens.
See generally Moeckli, supra note 11, at 504-05.
240. Roach, supra note 136, at 2198-2203.
241. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 51-52 (1978).
242. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 83.3(2) (1985).
243. Cf Nicole Fritz & Martin Flaherty, Unjust Order: Malaysia's Internal Security Act, 26
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1345, 1346 (2003).
244. Cf Margaret H. Taylor, Dangerous by Decree: Detention Without Bond in Immigration
Proceedings, 50 Loy. L. REv. 149, 149-50 (2004) ("[T]his provision was not used in the post-9/11
detention effort. Instead, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) relied on the detention
authority in the existing immigration statute.").
245. See New Terror Law Comes Into Force, BBC.coM, Apr. 13, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/uk-politics/4905304.stm.
246. Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), 2005, c. 2 (U.K.).
247. Powell, supra note 73, at 94.
248. PTA c. 2, § l(2)(b). The hearing procedure contemplates a special counsel. Powell, supra
note 73.
249. PTA c. 2, §§ l(2)(a), 3(4).
250. See generally In re Sealed Case, 3 10 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
251. See Nola K. Breglio, Note, Leaving FISA Behind: The Need to Return to Warrrantless
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 113 YALE L.J. 179, 192-93 (2003).
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refuse to consider any secret evidence unrelated to an immigration
investigation. 252 This list is surely not exhaustive.
B. The Weakness of the Due Process Clause Argument
Even to the extent my proposals are flawed or difficult to realize, they
are probably improvements on-and more likely to succeed than-the current
approach, which has been to argue that the use of secret evidence is
unconstitutional. In this Section, I address the strongest253 and most popular
constitutional argument 254 made by civil libertarians-that the use of secret
evidence to deny non-citizens bail or asylum255 is unconstitutional-and show
how it is ineffective both as a matter of law and as a matter of policy.
1. Legal Weakness
The constitutional argument against the use of secret evidence to deny
bail or asylum proceeds in two steps. First, those not yet subject to a final
removal order but who are out-of-status (i.e. have violated some immigration
law) must be treated like LPRs. Second, the language of the INA must be
parsed and read to limit the Secretary of Homeland Security's discretion to
deny bond or asylum.
Each move is necessary, not sufficient. Excludable non-citizens have
few rights under the Due Process Clause. Indeed, while they are not bereft of
constitutional protection-they enjoy, for instance, protection against
inhumane treatment256 they have almost no constitutional process rights,257
and may be subject to indefinite detention if necessary to further an
immigration goal. Therefore, to invoke the Due Process Clause, a non-
citizen applying for bail or asylum relief must argue that she is somehow
differently situated than an excludable non-citizen. Moreover, the Due Process
Clause not only protects a limited set of people, but also a limited set of
interests. Only if a non-citizen can show that she has a judicially cognizable
liberty or property interest can she claim due process protection.
259
In Najjar v. Reno, for instance, the court refused to permit the
government to use secret evidence against a non-citizen applying for bail.260 It
252. Cf Matthew R. Hall, Constitutional Regulation of National Security investigation:
Minimizing the Use of Unrelated Evidence, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 61 (2006) (making an analogous
argument with respect to FISA).
253. Any constitutional argument against the ATRC, for instance, seems likely to fail. See, e.g.,
Matter of M-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 484 (BIA 1953) (permitting a confidential informant to testify at a removal
hearing).
254. Hall, supra note 59, at 518 ("[Tlhis Note focuses on the use of undisclosed information to
defeat an application for discretionary relief.").
255. To reiterate, I deal here only with bail and asylum, not withholding of removal, which is a
form of non-discretionary relief.
256. See, e.g., Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1374 (5th Cir. 1987).
257. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) ("Whatever
the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.").
258. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
259. See Najjar v. Reno, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (emphasis added).
260. See id. at 1333 (objecting to the decision of an immigration judge denying bail because
"[n]either Petitioner nor his counsel were present").
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first echoed the district court in Kiareldeen and held that a non-citizen who
had conceded deportability should not "be 'assimilated' to the status of an
excludable alien."2 61 It then held that INA § 236 (authorizing the release of
non-citizens on bail pending resolution of their claims) 262 imposed substantive
Due Process Clause limits on the discretion of the Attorney General.263
But non-citizens applying for bail or asylum should, under current
law,264 be treated like those seeking admission at the border, not like those
within our borders who contest their removability. 265 Also, the INA does not
sufficiently circumscribe the Attorney General's discretion to permit a non-
citizen to claim a liberty interest in bail or asylum. In particular, it is hard to
square the view that the Due Process Clause covers requests for bail or asylum
with recent Supreme Court precedent.
Prior to 1995, courts would ask whether a statute limited the discretion
of a decision maker; if it did, the statute created a due process right. In
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, for
instance, the Supreme Court ruled that "the use of the word 'shall' indicated
a limitation.266 Yet in Sandin v. Conner, the Supreme Court refused to hold
that mandatory language created a liberty interest.267 Subsequently, the Court
has held that even though there are established (and discretion-limiting)
procedures for resolving clemency petitions, a death row inmate has no liberty
or life interest in clemency.
268
Before Sandin, courts seldom held that non-citziens could invoke the
Due Process Clause in seeking discretionary relief. For instance, courts have
discerned no due process right for non-citizens to immigrant visas.269 Also,
the INS may transfer non-citizens from one location to another without
270
affording them hearings. Since Sandin, courts have been even more
reluctant to infer that a statute endows a non-citizen with a liberty or property
interest sufficient to trigger the Due Process Clause.
27 1
261. Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 410 (D.N.J. 1999).
262. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 236(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226 (2000)).
263. Najjar, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1350-51.
264. 1 in no way mean to intimate my support for the current state of immigration law. I simply
mean to argue that the due process argument is likely ineffective under established precedent.
265. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). The Seventh Circuit agrees that Demore supports
this proposition. See Gonzalez v. O'Connell, 355 F.3d 1010, 1019 (7th Cir. 2004) ("In ... Kim. . . the
detainees at issue conceded their deportability. Indeed, Kim's holding was expressly premised on that
fact.") (internal citations omitted).
266. 442 U.S. 1, 11 (1979); see also Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1983).
267. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995). See generally Scott F. Weisman, Note,
Sandin v. Conner: Lowering the Boom on the Procedural Rights of Prisoners, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 897,
906-07 (1997).
268. Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998). The Court called the
proposed interest in clemency a "unilateral hope." Id. at 282 (internal citation omitted).
269. Azizi v. Thornburgh, 908 F.2d 1130, 1134 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that the INA granted a
married couple no property interest in an immigrant visa); Anetekhai v. INS, 876 F.2d 1218, 1223 (5th
Cir. 1989) (same).
270. Committee of Central American Refugees v. INS, 795 F.2d 1434, 1439-40 (9th Cir. 1986).
271. United States v. Aguirre-Tello, 353 F.3d 1199, 1205 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (holding
that "there is no constitutional right to be informed of the existence of discretionary relief for which a
potential deportee might be eligible"); Dave v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir. 2004) (same);
Oguejiofor v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 277 F.3d 1305, 1309 (11 th Cir. 2002) (same); United States v. Lopez-
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Most forms of relief from removal are discretionary. As the Supreme
Court explained in INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, the INA "imposes no limitations
on the factors that the Attorney General (or her delegate, the [NS[)] ... may
consider in determining who, among the class of eligible aliens, should be
granted relief.''272 Bail and asylum are no different. First, there is no right to
bail, even for a U.S. citizen accused of a crime. 273 As the Supreme Court
affirmed in Carlson v. Landon, "[tjhe Eighth Amendment has not prevented
Congress from defining.., bail."2  Although there are a handful of cases that
suggest that the discretion of the Attorney General to grant or deny bail may
275be limited, the Attorney General has recently explicitly said, "section
236(a) does not give detained aliens any right to release on bond., 27 6 And
second, "the decision to grant asylum is committed to the Attorney General's




Even if non-citizens seeking bail or asylum could invoke the Due
Process Clause, would it make sense to permit them to do so? My answer is a
qualified279 "no" for two reasons. 280 First, due process is not static; it varies
Ortiz, 313 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 2002) (same); Escudero-Corona v. INS, 244 F.3d 608, 615 (8th Cir.
2001) (same); Huicochea-Gomez v. INS, 237 F.3d 696, 700 (6th Cir. 2001) (same).
272. 519 U.S. 26, 30 (1996); see also Appiah v. INS, 202 F.3d 704, 709 (4th Cir. 2000) ("[Tlhe
stop-time provision only limits Appiah's eligibility for discretionary relief-it does not infringe on a
right."); Mejia Rodriguez v. Reno, 178 F.3d 1139, 1147 (11 th Cir. 1999) ("'[Sluspension of deportation'
is an 'act of grace' committed to the 'unfettered discretion' of the Attorney General.") (internal citations
omitted); Ashki v. INS, 233 F.3d 913, 921 (6th Cit. 2000) (holding that there is "no constitutionally-
protected liberty interest in obtaining discretionary relief from deportation"); Gonzalez-Torres v. INS,
213 F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 2000) (same).
273. June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor's New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic
Principles in the Administration of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 529-33 (1983); cf U.S. CONST.
amend. VIll; see also C. FOOTE, STUDIES ON BAIL 195-97 (1966) (discussing colonial-era state rights to
bail).
274. 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952); see also Sistrunk v. Lyons, 646 F.2d 64, 70 (3d Cir. 1981)
("Unlike most guarantees in the Bill of Rights, it is not the naked right to bail with which we deal, rather
it is the right to be free from excessive bail.") (internal citations omitted).
275. O'Rourke v. Warden, 539 F.Supp. 1131, 1135 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("The BIA ...has
construed [8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)] to provide that the determination to release an alien pending deportation
proceedings is 'not a discretionary form of relief....'); see also In re Drysdale, 20 1. & N. Dec. 815,
817 (BIA 1994); In re De La Cruz, 20 1. & N. Dec. 346, 349 (BIA 1991).
276. In re D-J-, 23 1. & N. Dec. 572, 575 (Att'y Gen. 2003) (emphasis added); see also id. at
576 ("[T]he INA does not limit the discretionary factors that may be considered by the Attorney General
in determining whether to detain an alien pending a decision on asylum or removal.").
277. Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added); see also
United States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 392, 395 (2d Cir. 1953); Cardoza-Fonseca v.
INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1451-52 (9th Cir. 1985).
278. Compare REAL ID Act of 2005 § 106(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231
(effective May 11, 2005) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (Supp. 2005)) (denying jurisdiction to hear
habeas corpus claims following an order of removal), with 8 U.S.C. § 11 58(a)(3) (2000) (stripping
courts of the power to review an IJ's discretionary determinations concerning eligibility for asylum); Li
Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2006). Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) ("No
court shall reverse a determination made by a trier of fact with respect to the availability of
corroborating evidence .... ) with Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 287 (2d Cir. 2000). See generally
Cianciarulo, supra note 11.
279. 1, like David Martin, do not argue that we should rely more heavily than we do on status
distinctions. See David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community: Political
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281with the circumstances. In Department of the Navy v. Egan, for instance,
the Supreme Court held that the government can withdraw the security
clearance of an employee without affording him an adversary hearing.282 The
Court relied on the fact that no one has a "right" to a security clearance. Non-
citizens who have conceded their deportability by definition have no "right" to
remain in the United States. It makes sense that they should enjoy fewer due
process rights than citizens.
Second, if the United States were to treat persons within its borders
equally,283 it might reinvigorate geographic distinctions. The government will
always distinguish among non-citizens. Too many members of Congress
believe that if it did not, it would unfairly equate those non-citizens who
aspire to citizenship with those whose claims are the most "provisional,
contingent, and [least] compelling., 284 The interrelationship of status and
geography in immigration law is such that as the salience of one diminishes,
that of the other increases.285 For instance, once courts hinted that non-citizen
enemy combatants might be able to invoke the Due Process Clause once
within the United States, the United States began to transfer prisoners to
Guantanamo Bay and farther afield.
But geography is arbitrary in a way that status is not. Why, for instance,
should those who have been illegally deported be forbidden to apply for
habeas relief simply because they are outside the United States? They should
286 287not. But if courts emphasize geography, they might be. Likewise, why
should one non-citizen, who sneaks ashore to the United States on a raft, be
treated differently than several hundred countrymen still on board the ship
from whence he came? 2
88
Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PINTT. L REv. 165, 174 (1983). 1 do not, for instance, believe that one could or
should argue that aliens who entered without inspection may not invoke the Due Process Clause at trial.
280. Again, however, I hasten to note that my discussion of the policy reasons for refusing non-
citizens applying for discretionary relief Due Process Clause protection is informed by my read on the
current politics of immigration reform and only to a limited extent my personal views on the matter.
281. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
282. 484 U.S. 518 (1988); see also Coalition of Airline Pilots Ass'ns v. FAA, 370 F.3d 1184
(D.C. Cir. 2004).
283. Since at least Kaplan v. Tod, the Supreme Court has distinguished between those who
have been legally admitted and those who have not. 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925).
284. Peter H. Schuck, The Re-Evaluation ofAmerican Citizenship, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 32
(1997). See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291
(1978).
285. See generally Kai Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 2501 (2005).
286. See Alison Leal Parker, Note, In Through the Out Door? Retaining Judicial Review for
Deported Lawful Permanent Resident Aliens, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 605, 607 (2001) ("[T]he 1996 INA
included a repeal of the jurisdictional bar against judicial review of the claims of already-deported
aliens."); see also, e.g., Mendez v. INS, 563 F.2d 956, 958-59 (9th Cir. 1977); Camacho-Bordes v. INS,
33 F.3d 26, 28 (8th Cir. 1994); Marrero v. INS, 990 F.2d 772, 777 (3d Cir. 1993).
287. But see Joehar v. INS, 957 F.2d 887, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (granting INS motion to
dismiss "on the ground that, because Joehar left the country, § 106(c) of the [INA], precludes ... review
of the decision ...."),
288. Allison Wexler, Note, The Murky Depths of the Entry Fiction Doctrine: The Plight of
Inadmissible Aliens Post-Zadvydas, 25 CARDOzo L. REv. 2029, 2059 (2004) ("Th[e] divide between
undocumented aliens who effected an entry on the one hand, and the other types of inadmissible aliens.
..led to incongruous case law."); see also Linda Bosniak, A Basic Territorial Distinction, 16 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 407,407-08 (2002).
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V. CONCLUSION
In the United States, a non-citizen who has conceded deportability and is
ready to board a plane back to his country of birth may be detained-"held
until cleared" 89 -by the FBI on the basis of secret evidence. This could not
happen to a similarly situated non-citizen in Canada or the United Kingdom. It
is not that those two nations forbid secret evidence in immigration cases (they
do not), but rather that both nations police the line between immigration law
enforcement and criminal law enforcement more effectively than the United
States. When either Canada or the United Kingdom relies on secret evidence,
it is less frequently a pretext for achieving criminal law enforcement aims.
For too long, Congress has abdicated its responsibility to consider
meaningfully the relationship between immigration and national security. But,
as Canada and the United Kingdom have already recognized, neither of these
two related problems is going away. When it convenes in January 2007, the
110th Congress should debate and clarify whether and how the U.S.
government can use immigration law in the War on Terror. If it tarries in
doing so, the judiciary should take steps-including by using motive
analysis-to encourage congressional action.
289. David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY
L.J. 1003, 1003 (2002).
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